

PAPER I | SECTION A

Q1 (a)

“Ideas are timeless and spaceless.” Elucidate this statement with reference to Plato.

(150 words)

Ideas as Ultimate Reality

For Plato, genuine knowledge (*epistēmē*) must be of what is universal, necessary and unchanging. Since the sensible world is in constant flux, it cannot be the object of true knowledge. Plato therefore posits the realm of Ideas or Forms as the ultimate reality.

Ideas are eternal and immutable. They do not come into being or perish and hence are not subject to time. Similarly, they are not located in physical space, as spatial determination belongs only to sensible particulars. A particular beautiful object exists here and now and is liable to decay, but the Idea of Beauty remains eternally identical.

- Ideas are eternal and immutable
- Sensible objects merely participate in Ideas

Thus, Ideas transcend both space and time and provide the metaphysical foundation of Plato's epistemology.

Ques (1) (a)

Realms of Ideas

(Timeless and Spaceless)

↓
Eternal & Immutable ↓ Universal Necessary
↓
True Knowledge.

"Particulars Participate in Ideas"

Sensible World

(Temporal and Spatial)

↓
Changing & Decaying

↓
Particular and limited

Note :- label clearly : "Realms of Ideas & "Sensible World". Mention key terms Immutable, eternal, universal, decaying.

Q1 (b)

"In the empirical world, everything is a compound of Matter and Form." Evaluate with reference to Aristotle.

(150 words)


Hylomorphism and Empirical Reality

Aristotle explains empirical reality through the doctrine of hylomorphism, according to which every concrete substance is a composite of matter (*hylē*) and form (*morphē*). Matter represents potentiality, while form actualises it and determines the essence of a thing.

In the empirical world, neither matter nor form exists independently. Matter without form is indeterminate, and form without matter cannot constitute a concrete object. Hence, all sensible substances are compounds of both, as seen in the example of a statue where bronze is matter and shape is form.

- Empirical substances are matter-form composites
- Matter and form are inseparable in experience

However, Aristotle admits metaphysical exceptions such as prime matter and God as pure actuality. Thus, the statement is valid within the empirical realm.



Q1 (c)

Explain the difference between being-for-itself and being-in-itself as presented by Sartre.

(150 words)

Sartre's Ontological Distinction

Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes between being-in-itself (*en-soi*) and being-for-itself (*pour-soi*) to explain the contrast between things and human existence.

Being-in-itself is the mode of existence of objects. It is complete, self-identical and devoid of consciousness. Such being simply *is what it is* and lacks the capacity for negation or self-transcendence.

- Fixed and determinate
- Lacks consciousness and freedom

Being-for-itself characterises human consciousness. Consciousness is not a thing but an activity that introduces nothingness by negating the given and projecting possibilities. It is therefore incomplete and essentially free.

- Conscious and intentional
- Basis of freedom and responsibility

This distinction underlines Sartre's rejection of essentialism and affirmation of radical human freedom.

Q1 (d)

“The golden mountain is very high.” Discuss this statement in the context of Russell’s theory of descriptions.

(150 words | 10 marks)

Theory of Descriptions

Bertrand Russell introduces the theory of descriptions to resolve the problem of meaningful statements containing non-existent entities.

The statement “The golden mountain is very high” appears grammatically meaningful but refers to no existing object. Russell argues that such sentences are misleading due to their surface grammar. Logically analysed, the statement asserts three claims:

- There exists a golden mountain
- There is only one such mountain
- That mountain is very high

Since no golden mountain exists, the first claim is false, and hence the entire proposition is false rather than meaningless. The description does not function as a name but as a quantificational expression.

Russell’s analysis avoids ontological commitment to non-existent entities and preserves the meaningfulness of negative existential statements. Thus, the sentence is meaningful but false, not nonsensical.

Q1 (e)

How does Hegel challenge Kant’s distinction between Phenomena and Noumena? Discuss.

(150 words | 10 marks)


Critique of the Phenomenon–Noumenon Divide

G. W. F. Hegel criticises Immanuel Kant’s distinction between phenomena (appearances) and noumena (things-in-themselves) as self-defeating.

Kant holds that noumena are unknowable, yet he must think them in order to limit knowledge to phenomena. Hegel argues that positing an unknowable reality already involves knowing something about it, namely that it exists beyond appearances. This renders the distinction inconsistent.

- An unknowable noumenon is a “thought-thing”
- Limiting reason presupposes reason’s access to what lies beyond

For Hegel, reality is not split into appearance and unknowable essence. Through dialectical development, thought progressively grasps reality as it truly is. Hence, the phenomenon–noumenon dualism is replaced by an identity of thought and being.



Q2 (a)

What are the basic tenets of Rationalism? How does Descartes build a system of philosophy in consonance with them?

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Rationalism: Core Commitments

Rationalism maintains that **reason is the primary source of knowledge**, superior to sense-experience. Rationalists argue that empirical knowledge is contingent and fallible, whereas reason can yield universal and necessary truths.

The basic tenets of rationalism include the following:

- Knowledge is grounded in **innate ideas**
- Certain truths are **self-evident and a priori**
- **Deductive method** is the model of philosophical reasoning
- Genuine knowledge possesses **certainty**, similar to mathematics

Descartes' Rationalist Method

René Descartes builds his philosophical system in conformity with these principles through the method of **systematic doubt**. He suspends all beliefs that admit the slightest possibility of error, including sensory knowledge and mathematical truths, in order to arrive at an indubitable foundation.

This process leads to the famous *cogito ergo sum*, which Descartes regards as a self-evident truth grasped by pure reason. The cogito exemplifies the rationalist claim that certainty arises from intellectual intuition rather than experience.

Deduction and Metaphysical System

From the cogito, Descartes deduces the existence of God as a perfect, non-deceptive being. The veracity of God guarantees the truth of **clear and distinct ideas**, thereby securing knowledge of the external world and the laws of nature.

- Innate ideas form the content of knowledge
- Deduction ensures systematic coherence

Thus, Descartes constructs a comprehensive philosophical system grounded in reason, fulfilling the rationalist ideal of certainty and systematic unity.

Q2 (b)

“All determination is negation.” Comment with reference to Spinoza.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Determination and Finitude

The dictum “all determination is negation” occupies a central place in Spinoza’s metaphysics. For Spinoza, to determine something is to limit it, and every limitation involves the exclusion of other possibilities, which is equivalent to negation.

Spinoza holds that **substance**, identified with God or Nature, is infinite and absolutely indeterminate. It involves no negation because it is unlimited. Negation arises only at the level of **finite modes**, which exist through determination.

Finite Modes and Negation

Finite things are determinate because they express substance in a limited manner. Their individuality is achieved by negating what they are not. Thus, finitude itself is a form of negation.

- Infinite substance involves no negation
- Determination introduces limitation

Spinoza uses this principle to reject the notion of independent finite substances. Individual things do not possess self-subsistent being but are expressions of the one substance under specific determinations.

Philosophical Significance

While this view strengthens Spinoza's monism, critics argue that it undermines genuine individuality and moral freedom. Nevertheless, the dictum effectively captures Spinoza's attempt to explain plurality without abandoning metaphysical unity.

Q2 (c)

Examine Hume's refutation of causal relation and Kant's response to it.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Hume's Critique of Causation

David Hume challenges the traditional notion of causation by arguing that we never perceive a necessary connection between cause and effect. Experience reveals only constant conjunction, not necessity. The idea of causation arises from psychological habit formed through repeated observation.

According to Hume, causal necessity is neither a relation of ideas nor a matter of fact. Hence, causal laws lack rational justification and are products of custom rather than reason.

Kant's Transcendental Reply

Immanuel Kant accepts Hume's critique of empirical necessity but rejects scepticism. Kant argues that causality is an **a priori category of understanding**, imposed by the mind to organise experience.

- Causality is not derived from experience
- It is a condition for the possibility of experience

Thus, while causation is not a property of things-in-themselves, it is universally and necessarily valid within the phenomenal realm.

Assessment

Hume dissolves causality into psychological expectation, whereas Kant restores its necessity at the level of cognition, thereby preserving scientific knowledge without reverting to metaphysical dogmatism.

Ques 2 (4)

Hume
Cause → Effect
(Observed as constant conjunction)
No Necessary connection
↓
Causation = Psychological habit / custom.

Kant
Mind imposes causality (a priori)
Cause → Effect
↓
Necessary for organising experience
valid within phenomenal realm.

Q3 (a)

Explain the transition from early to later views of Wittgenstein on language and meaning.

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Early View: Ideal Language

In his early philosophy, especially in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein held that language represents reality by picturing facts. Meaning consisted in a proposition's logical correspondence with states of affairs. An ideal logical language was required to eliminate philosophical confusion.

Language, on this view, had a fixed logical structure, and meaningful propositions were those that could be analysed into atomic facts.

Later View: Meaning as Use

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein abandons the ideal language model. He argues that language does not have a single essence. Meaning arises from **use within concrete social practices**, which he calls language-games.

- Meaning is contextual
- Language is rule-governed but flexible

Different forms of life generate different linguistic functions, and philosophical problems arise when language is detached from its ordinary use.

Nature of the Transition

The transition marks a shift from formalism to contextualism. Wittgenstein replaces logical analysis with grammatical clarification, holding that philosophy should describe how language is actually used rather than construct ideal models.

Q3 (b)

Present an exposition of the verification theory of meaning and distinguish between strong and weak verification.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Verification Principle

The verification theory of meaning, advanced by logical positivists, holds that a proposition is meaningful only if it is either analytically true or empirically verifiable. Statements that fail this test, particularly metaphysical claims, are dismissed as meaningless.

The principle aimed to align philosophy with scientific empiricism and eliminate speculative metaphysics.

Strong and Weak Verification

Strong verification requires conclusive empirical confirmation. This proved too restrictive, as universal scientific laws cannot be conclusively verified.

Weak verification allows partial or probabilistic confirmation through experience.

- Strong: conclusive verification
- Weak: possible confirmation in principle

Evaluation

The shift to weak verification preserved scientific discourse but weakened the criterion. The theory faced criticism for being self-refuting and overly dismissive of ethical and metaphysical language, leading to its eventual decline.

Q3 (c)

Present Moore's refutation of idealism with reference to the given statement.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Refutation of Idealism

G. E. Moore challenges idealism by rejecting the claim that objects are inseparable from consciousness. The given statement illustrates his argument that sensation and consciousness must be distinguished.

Blue and green are distinct objects of sensation, while consciousness is common to both but identical with neither. To identify an object with the act of awareness is to commit a fallacy.

- Sensation is not identical with consciousness
- Objects are independent of being perceived

Moore accuses idealists of confusing the content of experience with the act of experiencing. This "existential fallacy" leads to the erroneous conclusion that objects depend on perception.

Philosophical Importance

By analytically separating sensation from consciousness, Moore defends common-sense realism and undermines the metaphysical basis of idealism.

Q4 (a)

How is Husserl's account of "I think" different from that of Descartes? Critically discuss.

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Cartesian and Phenomenological Ego

Descartes arrives at the "I think" (*cogito*) through methodical doubt and treats it as a **thinking substance** whose existence is immediately certain. The cogito establishes the ego as a self-subsisting entity distinct from the body and the external world.

Husserl, while acknowledging the importance of the cogito, radically transforms its meaning through phenomenology. By employing **epoché** and phenomenological reduction, Husserl suspends metaphysical assumptions and arrives at the **transcendental ego**, not as a substance but as the **pure unity of consciousness** underlying intentional acts.


Key Differences

- Descartes' ego is a **substance**; Husserl's ego is **non-substantial**
- Descartes seeks metaphysical certainty; Husserl seeks **eidetic description**
- Cartesian "I" exists independently; Husserlian "I" is inseparable from intentionality

For Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness *of* something. The "I think" is therefore not an isolated self but the formal structure that unifies experiences.

Critical Assessment

Critics argue that Husserl covertly reintroduces subjectivity under the guise of transcendental ego, risking a return to idealism. However, Husserl avoids Cartesian dualism by refusing to treat the ego as a metaphysical substance. His account shifts the focus from ontological certainty to the conditions of possibility of experience.



Q4 (b)

"We can affirm the truth of any sentence in our total system...." Discuss this statement in the light of Quine's *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Rejection of Empiricist Dogmas

In *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, Quine challenges two central assumptions of traditional empiricism: the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. According to Quine, no statement is true in isolation; rather, statements form part of an interconnected **web of beliefs**.

The given statement reflects Quine’s doctrine of **confirmation holism**, according to which experience tests the entire system of beliefs rather than individual propositions.

Holism and Revisability

Quine argues that any belief, including logical and mathematical truths, can be revised if required to preserve the coherence of the system.

- No belief is immune to revision
- Adjustment can occur anywhere in the system

Thus, when experience conflicts with expectation, we may revise peripheral beliefs or even central principles, depending on pragmatic considerations.

Philosophical Implications

This view undermines the notion of fixed foundations of knowledge and rejects the analytic–synthetic divide. Truth becomes system-relative rather than absolute, grounded in pragmatic coherence rather than empirical reduction. Quine thereby reshapes empiricism into a naturalised and holistic framework.

Q4 (c)

Explain Berkeley’s doctrine of nominalism and his refutation of abstract ideas.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Rejection of Abstract Ideas

Berkeley’s nominalism is directed against the Lockean theory of abstract ideas. Berkeley argues that the mind cannot form abstract ideas separated from all particular features. All ideas are concrete and particular, derived from perception.

According to Berkeley, the supposed abstract idea of, for example, “triangle” that is neither equilateral nor scalene is psychologically impossible.

Nominalism and General Terms

Berkeley explains generality not through abstract ideas but through the **use of words**. A general term signifies many particular ideas by being used as a sign applicable to them.

- Ideas are always particular
- Generality lies in linguistic function

Philosophical Significance

By rejecting abstraction, Berkeley seeks to eliminate scepticism and metaphysical confusion. His nominalism supports his immaterialism, according to which only ideas and spirits exist. While critics argue that this weakens scientific generalisation, Berkeley maintains that abstraction is unnecessary for meaningful discourse.

Q5 (a)

Explain the grounds on which Cārvāka rejects inference (anumāna) as a valid source of knowledge.

(10 marks | ~150 words)

Cārvāka's Epistemological Stand

Cārvāka accepts **perception (pratyakṣa)** alone as a valid means of knowledge and rejects inference (*anumāna*) as unreliable.

The central ground for rejecting inference is the **problem of vyāpti** (invariable concomitance). According to Cārvāka, inference depends on a universal relation between the middle and major term, which cannot be established without circularity. Vyāpti cannot be known either through perception, since perception is limited, or through inference, since that would be circular.

- Universal generalisation is unjustified
- Inference rests on uncertain assumptions

Further, Cārvāka argues that causal relations are not necessary but accidental. Since inference relies on assumed necessity, it lacks certainty. Thus, inference is rejected as speculative and non-verifiable.

Q5 (b)

Present an exposition of the debate between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists with reference to Pramāṇa and Pramāṇaphala.

(10 marks | ~150 words)

Pramāṇa–Pramāṇaphala Debate


Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy differ fundamentally on the relation between **means of knowledge (pramāṇa)** and **result of knowledge (pramāṇaphala)**.

Naiyāyikas maintain that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are **distinct**. Pramāṇa is the instrument (e.g., perception), while pramāṇaphala is valid cognition (*pramā*).

Buddhists, especially Yogācāras, argue that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are **identical**, since cognition is self-revealing and does not require an external instrument.

- Nyāya: Instrumental realism
- Buddhism: Cognition-centred epistemology

The debate reflects deeper metaphysical differences regarding realism and idealism.



Q5 (c)

Delineate the main points of difference between svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda and parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda.

(10 marks | ~150 words)

Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Validity

Classical Indian philosophy debates whether the **validity of knowledge** is intrinsic or extrinsic.

Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, upheld by Mīmāṃsā and Advaita, holds that cognition is valid **by itself** unless contradicted. Validity is self-established.

Parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, defended by Nyāya, argues that validity is known **through external conditions**, such as causal reliability and absence of defects.

- Svataḥ: validity is intrinsic
- Parataḥ: validity requires verification

The disagreement concerns not truth itself but how truth is apprehended and justified.

Q5 (d)

Examine Rāmānuja's seven objections against Māyāvāda of Advaita.

(10 marks | ~150 words)

Critique of Māyāvāda

Rāmānuja strongly criticises the Advaita doctrine of Māyā for undermining realism and devotion.

His objections include:

- Māyā is indefinable and logically incoherent
- Illusion cannot arise without a real substratum
- Brahman cannot be both pure consciousness and locus of ignorance

Rāmānuja argues that the world cannot be dismissed as illusory since it is experienced and scripturally affirmed.

- Illusion presupposes reality
- Scripture supports real plurality

Thus, Māyāvāda fails to provide a coherent metaphysical account.

Q5 (e)

Present an exposition of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika's theory of causation.

(10 marks | ~150 words)

Asatkāryavāda and Causation

Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika upholds **asatkāryavāda**, according to which the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.

Causation involves three factors:

- **Samavāyi kāraṇa** (material cause)
- **Asamavāyi kāraṇa** (inherent cause)
- **Nimitta kāraṇa** (efficient cause)

The effect is a new entity produced under appropriate conditions. For example, cloth is not pre-existent in threads but newly produced.

This view supports pluralistic realism and rejects both Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda and Advaita's apparent causation.

Q6 (a)

Present a detailed account of Gautama's definition of Perception.

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Nyāya Theory of Perception

Gautama defines perception as **indeterminate and determinate cognition produced by the contact of sense-organs with objects**, free from verbal association.

Perception arises through **sannikarṣa** (sense-object contact). Nyāya recognises several kinds of contact, such as conjunction, inherence and qualifier–qualified relation.

Stages of Perception

Nyāya distinguishes two stages:

- **Nirvikalpaka**: indeterminate perception without conceptualisation
- **Savikalpaka**: determinate perception involving name, class and relation

Perception is also classified as:

- External (bāhya)
- Internal (mānasa)

Characteristics

- Non-verbal
- Immediate
- Non-erroneous

Nyāya emphasises realism, holding that perception reveals objects as they exist independently of cognition. Despite criticism regarding nirvikalpaka perception, Nyāya's theory remains a robust realist epistemology.

Q6 (b)

How is Brahman conceptualised as both Nimitta and Upādāna Kāraṇa of the world in Advaita philosophy?

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Brahman as Dual Cause

Advaita Vedānta holds that **Brahman is both the efficient (nimitta) and material (upādāna) cause** of the universe.


Unlike Nyāya, which separates causes, Advaita argues that Brahman alone appears as the world through **Māyā**. There is no second material cause apart from Brahman.

- Nimitta: Brahman as intelligent cause
- Upādāna: Brahman as substratum

The classic example is clay and pot, where clay alone becomes the pot. Similarly, Brahman appears as the world without undergoing real change.

This is explained through **vivarta-vāda**, where the effect is an apparent transformation. Brahman remains unchanged while the world appears through ignorance.

Ques 6 (b)



Note :- Clay → pot analogy, vivarta-vada: apparent transformation, Brahman unchanged.

Q6 (c)

Discuss the debate between the Bhaṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas on the nature of Abhāva and its knowledge.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Abhāva and Its Cognition

The two schools of Mīmāṃsā differ sharply on **non-existence (abhāva)** and its apprehension.

Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā holds that abhāva is a distinct ontological category and is known through a separate pramāṇa called **anupalabdhi**.

Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā rejects abhāva as a separate category and denies anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. Absence is known through perception itself.

- Bhaṭṭa: Abhāva is real and knowable
- Prābhākara: No separate cognition of absence

The debate reflects deeper epistemological differences regarding cognition, error and the structure of experience.

Q7 (a)

Why does Śāṅkara consider Sāṃkhya philosophy as his chief opponent (pradhāna-malla)? Examine his arguments against Sāṃkhya philosophy.

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Sāṃkhya as the Principal Opponent

Śaṅkara regards Sāṃkhya as his chief opponent because it presents the most systematic and metaphysically sophisticated non-Vedāntic explanation of reality. Its doctrine of **Prakṛti as the ultimate cause** directly challenges Advaita's claim that Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

Śaṅkara's Critique of Prakṛti

Śaṅkara argues that unconscious Prakṛti cannot account for the ordered and purposive nature of the universe. An insentient principle cannot initiate creation without the guidance of intelligence.

- An unconscious cause cannot produce intelligent effects
- Teleology presupposes consciousness


Further, Śaṅkara criticises Sāṃkhya's theory of **satkāryavāda**, arguing that pre-existence of the effect undermines genuine causation and makes creation redundant.

Critique of Pluralism

Śaṅkara rejects the Sāṃkhya doctrine of multiple **puruṣas**, contending that plurality of selves leads to logical difficulties regarding liberation and bondage. If puruṣas are identical in nature, their plurality becomes unintelligible.

Advaitic Alternative

Śaṅkara proposes Brahman as both the material and efficient cause of the universe, preserving unity without denying empirical diversity. Thus, Sāṃkhya is treated as the strongest rival whose refutation is essential for establishing non-dualism.



Q7 (b)

Explain the nature of God and His role in Kaivalya in Yoga philosophy.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Īśvara in Yoga Philosophy

Patañjali introduces God (Īśvara) as a **special puruṣa**, distinct from ordinary selves. Īśvara is untouched by afflictions, karma and latent impressions.

Unlike Vedānta, Yoga does not regard God as the creator of the world. God is neither the material nor efficient cause of creation but functions as a **spiritual exemplar**.

- Īśvara is eternally free
- He is omniscient but not creator

Role in Kaivalya

Kaivalya, or liberation, is achieved through the complete isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti. God assists the aspirant by serving as an object of devotion and concentration.

Īśvara-praṇidhāna (devotion to God) purifies the mind and accelerates the attainment of samādhī. However, liberation ultimately results from discriminative knowledge (*viveka-khyāti*), not divine grace.

Assessment

Thus, God in Yoga has a soteriological but not ontological role. This preserves Yoga's metaphysical dualism while allowing devotional practice.

Q7 (c)

Is Jaina philosophy pluralistic and realistic? Critically discuss.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Pluralism and Realism in Jainism

Jain philosophy is both pluralistic and realistic. It accepts the independent reality of **jīva** (souls) and **ajīva** (non-souls), rejecting monism.

Reality is conceived as multifaceted, consisting of substances with infinite attributes and modes. This ontological pluralism is complemented by **epistemological pluralism**.

- Multiple substances exist independently
- Knowledge is partial and perspectival

Doctrine of Anekāntavāda

Anekāntavāda holds that reality cannot be exhaustively grasped from a single standpoint. Each judgment is conditionally true, expressed through **syādvāda**.

Critical Assessment

Critics argue that extreme pluralism risks relativism and logical inconsistency. However, Jain philosophers maintain that conditional predication preserves objectivity while avoiding dogmatism.

Thus, Jain philosophy upholds a robust realism tempered by epistemic humility, making it both pluralistic and philosophically sophisticated.

Q8 (a)

Discuss the idea of Bimba–Pratibimbavāda as presented in Vedānta philosophy along with its soteriological significance.

(20 marks | ~300 words)

Doctrine of Reflection

Bimba–Pratibimbavāda is an Advaitic explanation of the relationship between **Brahman** and **jīva**. According to this view, Brahman is the original (*bimba*), and the individual self is its reflection (*pratibimba*) in the medium of ignorance (*avidyā*).

The reflected consciousness appears finite and limited, though its essence remains Brahman itself.

- Brahman is unchanged
- Jīva is an apparent reflection

Metaphysical Implication

The reflection theory explains how plurality arises without compromising non-dualism. Differences among individuals are due to variations in the reflecting medium, not in Brahman.

Soteriological Significance

Liberation occurs when ignorance is removed and the reflected self realises its identity with the original. Knowledge (*jñāna*) dissolves the apparent distinction between bimba and pratibimba.

This doctrine emphasises self-knowledge rather than ritual or divine intervention as the means to liberation. It thus reinforces Advaita's central soteriological claim that liberation is recognition, not transformation.

Q8 (b)

“Both ascetic and materialist are partial in their negation of each other.” Explain Sri Aurobindo’s integral philosophy in the light of this statement.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Critique of Exclusivism

Sri Aurobindo criticises both ascetic idealism and materialism for being one-sided. Asceticism denies the value of the world, while materialism denies spiritual reality.

According to Aurobindo, both positions negate each other partially but fail to grasp the totality of existence.

Integral Philosophy

Integral philosophy seeks a synthesis of matter and spirit. Reality is a dynamic manifestation of **Sachchidananda**, evolving through matter, life and mind towards supramental consciousness.

- Matter is not illusion
- Spirit is not world-negating

Significance

Liberation is not escape from the world but its spiritual transformation. Thus, Aurobindo reconciles ascetic transcendence with material affirmation.

Q8 (c)

Discuss the Buddhist notion of Nirvāṇa in consonance with their conception of Kṣaṇikavāda and Nairātmyavāda. Critically discuss.

(15 marks | ~250 words)

Nirvāṇa and Buddhist Ontology

Buddhist philosophy explains Nirvāṇa in harmony with **momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda)** and **no-self doctrine (nairātmyavāda)**.

Since all phenomena are momentary, there is no permanent self to be liberated. Nirvāṇa is the cessation of the causal chain of suffering, not the salvation of a soul.

- No enduring self exists
- Liberation is cessation, not attainment

Critical Assessment

Critics argue that denying self undermines moral responsibility and continuity. Buddhists respond that continuity is causal, not substantial.

Thus, Nirvāṇa represents freedom from ignorance and craving, consistent with Buddhist metaphysics.