02 Apr India’s nuclear doctrine
India’s nuclear doctrine – Today Current Affairs
Recently, Russia raised the alert level for its nuclear forces in response to what it called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provocations. These events have relevance for India as, in the 21st century, Russia changed its nuclear doctrine periodically to cater for weaknesses in its conventional military forces. It is therefore essential for India to examine the robustness of its nuclear strategy, especially as our “no-first use” (NFU) doctrine was conceived as an idealistic measure to lower the possibility of a nuclear war with
Today Current Affairs
Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory (Deterrence is a strategy that stops the adversary from doing something that you do not want him to do by making him believe that the cost of action would be far greater than any benefit he would make.), is criticised for its assumptions about opponent rationales: first, it is argued that deterrence may not deter suicidal or psychopathic opponents. Second, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing political ideologies may lead to escalating mutual perceptions of threat and a subsequent arms race, which elevates the risk of actual war. An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output, as all the countries involved expend excess resources. A military build-up increases a country’s risks of budget deficits.
Survivability of Nuclear Assets : The Hindu Analysis
India’s nuclear doctrine calls for a credible minimum deterrence. The doctrine suggests that India’s strategic forces be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets. These assets would need to be survivable and viable. It is a well-known fact that only the sea-based deterrent is relatively survivable, and this is a common thread running in all overtly nuclear countries. The United Kingdom’s (UK) nuclear deterrent is only based on submarines. Consequently, India had no alternative but to focus on a credible sea-based deterrent.
Constraints of the Sea-based Deterrent : The Hindu Analysis
However, more than two decades later, India is not only constrained by the limited availability of the Submersible Ship Ballistic Missile Nuclear (SSBN) but also a submarine-launched ballistic missile K-15 of insufficient range (restricted to 700 kilometres [km]). Therefore, the SSBN needs to be deployed relatively closer to an enemy coast to cater for any threats. Thus, they cannot be deployed in the ‘‘bastion’’ concept (protected by their own forces in a layered defence concept) near their operating base and need the protection of an SSN. Presently, only Indian navy ship (INS) Arihant is available, and INS Arighat (S3) is yet to be commissioned, possibly due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Bhattacharjee 2022; Bedi 2021b). It was reported by the Janes Defence Weekly that the third SSBN designated as S4 was launched quietly on 23 November 2021. This submarine is expected to carry eight K-4 (range 3,500 km) or 24 K-15 SLBMs. There are reports that the K-4 has been productionised after only about six launches , though it has taken years for such systems to be proven in other advanced navies.
The K-4 would permit launch to targets in China and Pakistan mainly from the northern part of the Bay of Bengal. It is also relevant to mention that if we consider China as a threat, the missile needs to reach about 6,000 km as Beijing and Shanghai are about 5,000 km and 5,200 km, respectively, from Karwar naval base on the west coast. The reason for this is that if the SSBN is located on the west coast, there is a greater chance of survivability as both Visakhapatnam and the upcoming submarine base on the east coast are likely to be targeted in the initial stages of a conflict. Irrespective of the nature of the threat, since China was the first nation to declare an unconditional NFU policy, the greater the range of the missile, the greater will be the flexibility in the SSBN’s deployment. Here, it must also be mentioned that for one SSBN to be deployed, there needs to be at least two other SSBNs available (one under a short maintenance period and the other in a long maintenance overhaul), or a ratio of 1:3. The same rule applies to SSNs as well.
According to media reports, the indigenous SSN programme is yet to receive CCS approval. If we take the example of INS Arihant, it took 19 years from the date of government approval in 1997 to commissioning the SSBN in 2016 . So, realistically, a figure of 20 years would be required for the first indigenous SSN to be commissioned from the time of CCS approval, notwithstanding the claims of 10 years as reported in the media . This is around the same estimate for the AUKUS programme, where the first SSN is likely to be available by 2040. Thus, India needs to progress on a fast track, both for the development of a credible long-range missile for its SSBNs as well as for the development of the indigenous SSNs.
Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine : The Hindu Analysis
Russia decided to give primacy to nuclear weapons in the 21st century to deter and manage escalation in conflicts that threaten its existence. This is due to the issue of conventional inferiority in a conflict with an enemy; for instance, the NATO. For Russia, the nuclear threat is a relevant escalation-management tool if it has utilized available conventional means, even in case of the possibility of a nuclear war (Arms Control Association 2020). The document released in 2020 reserves the right of Russia to use nuclear weapons in four scenarios.
The two additional scenarios contained in the 2020 document include:
The Russian nuclear doctrine distinctly expresses a willingness to risk further escalation, taking into account its threat perception and military forces. However, not all Western experts agree with this view, and others state that it is defensive and will be only in response to an existential threat. It may be argued that this policy has also deterred NATO’s direct involvement in Ukraine, though the Western mainstream media has sought to characterize President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of increasing the alert levels of Russian nuclear deterrence forces as irrational. Consequently, it may be relevant for India’s policymakers to examine Russia’s doctrine and use it as a guideline for modifications of India’s own strategy.
US Strategic Posture Review : The Hindu Analysis
The review of the long-term strategic posture of the US is done periodically by a commission appointed by the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA). This encompasses a comprehensive assessment of threats, a reassessment of the nuclear weapon’s policy and doctrine, recommendations regarding the most appropriate nuclear posture and an optimum nuclear weapon’s policy and strategy. The last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report was submitted in 2018 and stated that the US nuclear forces contribute to the deterrence of both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, assurance of allies, achievement of the US goals, if deterrence fails, and the capability to cater for an uncertain future. The report also laid out a plan for the modernisation of nuclear forces, including the reintroduction of submarine-launch cruise missiles with nuclear capabilities that had been phased out earlier.
Key Elements of Nuclear Deterrent Policy : The Hindu Analysis
India must, therefore, design a nuclear policy to cope with all existing threats and maintain a nuclear strategy that is in keeping with its long-term national security interests. Three key elements must be included in such a policy and strategy. First, India must have a pragmatic and prudent nuclear force structure that can deter adversaries with proven nuclear weapons capability (Kristensen and Korda 2021b, 2021c). An NPR should periodically review the force structure (Figure 1) by an independent body of experts with representatives who have had domain experience in the Department of Atomic Energy, Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Ministry of Defense, Service Headquarters and Strategic Forces Command.
This NPR Committee, appointed by the Prime Minister, would be mandated to periodically review (at least once in five years) the doctrine, strategic targeting policy, force structure, command and control structure, survivability and personnel management of the Indian nuclear deterrent in keeping with the dynamics of the geopolitical environment. This body would then submit its report to the National Security Advisor, who would convene a meeting of the executive council to examine the report. This executive council, along with the NPR Committee, would then brief the political council headed by the Prime Minister. The political council could finally issue a nuclear policy guideline framework, which the executive council would implement.
Second, India must ensure that it does not enter into arms control agreements that impinge on India’s nuclear strategy or undermine its deterrence abilities. Third, India must ensure that its technological competencies and strategies are in keeping with those of the nuclear weapons states in its neighborhood. Finally, notwithstanding the odds and skeptics, there is a need to progress a nuclear NFU treaty and nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) with both Pakistan and China. In this regard, the New Security Policy issued by Pakistan and the reiteration of China’s NFU policy are welcome steps that would aid this process. This would act as a hedge against the existing weakness of India’s NFU policy.
Today Current Affairs
In Conclusion
It would be relevant to recall Henry Kissinger’s (1957) words that “It is important to distinguish … between the possession of nuclear weapons and their strategic effectiveness.” The last official announcement regarding a modification to India’s NFU policy was made in 2003, and since then, the geopolitical environment and nuclear doctrines of nuclear powers have also seen changes. The concept of recessed deterrence constrains the readiness of India’s nuclear forces. Therefore, India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be modified after an NPR. India should reserve the right to resume testing and also for first use against a nuclear weapon power in case of a threat to its existence. Developing a truly long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile is essential to ensure credible minimum deterrence.
In the interim, India has no alternative but to protect its limited fleet of SSBNs by SSNs. For that, the force levels of SSNs need to be catered for as an indigenous programme, which is unlikely to materialize before 2040. Indian military planners need to be conscious of budgetary constraints while preparing wish lists. Conventional military forces may need to be downsized to cater to the increased expenditure in developing a credible and robust nuclear deterrent.
In this article we mention all information about India’s nuclear doctrine – Today Current Affairs
Download Plutus ias daily current affairs 2 April 2022
No Comments