UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 — Political Science and International Relations Optional Paper II: Questions with Model Answers | Plutus IAS

07 Sep UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 — Political Science and International Relations Optional Paper II: Questions with Model Answers | Plutus IAS

The questions below are from Political Science and International Relations Optional Paper II of UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 (held 2026-08-30) — the actual paper, which is public. Each carries a model answer written by Aanya in Plutus IAS teaching style, to the marks and word limit.

Official source: official (upsc.gov.in).

Q1. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) Criticism of the institutional approach in comparative political analysis has come up in successive waves. Comment. 10 (b) Extractive capitalism 10 (c) Discuss various methods of Balance of Power. 10 (d) Clientilism 10 (e) What role does identity and technology play in the conceptualisation of Defensive realism ? 10 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Comment” asks for a critical evaluation of successive waves of criticism against the institutional approach in comparative political analysis. The examiner is testing your grasp of the evolution of this approach, the nature of critiques (behavioralist, post-behavioralist, postmodern), and the revival under new institutionalism. A top answer must structure the critique into three waves (1950s–60s behavioralist, 1970s–80s post-behavioralist/postmodern, and 2000s–2020s post-colonial/neo-institutionalist), and end with a balanced conclusion. The common mistake is to treat “institutional approach” as only formal institutions and miss the informal (caste, gender) or the behavioralist demand for scientific rigor.

Model answer

The institutional approach in comparative political analysis emerged in the late 19th–early 20th century, prioritising formal institutions such as constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries as the primary units of political life. Its early proponents—from Woodrow Wilson to Max Weber—assumed that institutions shape behaviour and outcomes in predictable ways. However, successive waves of criticism have repeatedly challenged this assumption.

The first wave, the behavioralist critique of the 1950s–60s, rejected institutionalism’s Eurocentric formalism and called for scientific rigor, quantification, and behaviour-based explanations. David Easton’s systems theory and Gabriel Almond’s structural-functionalism shifted focus from institutions to inputs, outputs, and systemic equilibrium, arguing that political behaviour, not formal rules, drives outcomes. Critics like Robert Dahl exposed the gap between constitutional promises and actual power distribution in polyarchies.

A second wave, the post-behavioralist critique of the 1970s–80s, faulted behavioralism for neglecting context, history, and power asymmetries. Feminist and post-colonial scholars highlighted how institutions encode gendered and racial hierarchies (e.g., caste panchayats, colonial legal codes). This led to the revival of institutionalism as “new institutionalism,” which reintegrated informal institutions (caste, clientelism, gender norms) and emphasised path dependence, historical legacies, and sociological embeddedness.

A third wave, emerging from the 2000s onward, targets new institutionalism itself for its static, often functionalist assumptions. Post-colonial and critical scholars argue that institutions are not neutral containers but sites of contestation shaped by colonial legacies, global capitalism, and identity politics. For example, India’s reservation policies reveal how formal institutions interact with informal caste networks to reproduce or challenge inequality.

In sum, successive waves of criticism—behavioralist, post-behavioralist, and critical—have exposed the limits of institutionalism’s formalism, its neglect of power and identity, and its static assumptions. Yet, each wave has also enriched the approach, culminating in a more nuanced, historically grounded, and pluralistic comparative political analysis.

Q2. (a) Discuss the factors responsible for the changing nature of states in contemporary industrial societies and explain its impact. 20 (b) International Human Rights frameworks are hostage to politics among nations. Comment. 15 (c) Diplomacy has always rested on two pillars : Institutional memory and individual craft. Elaborate. 15 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Discuss” asks for a balanced analysis of causes and consequences. Examiners test your ability to (1) identify the key factors reshaping the state in industrial societies, (2) explain their causal mechanisms with concrete examples, and (3) assess the societal and political impacts. The common mistake is to list factors without linking them to specific outcomes or to ignore counter-trends such as resurgent nationalism.

Model answer

The contemporary industrial state is undergoing a structural metamorphosis driven by three mutually reinforcing factors: globalization, technological revolution, and demographic shifts.

Factors:

• Globalization and Financialization: Capital mobility, WTO rules, and offshore production chains have eroded traditional fiscal sovereignty; states now compete for FDI while regulating global supply chains (e.g., EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, 2023).
• Digital Disruption: Platform economies and AI redefine labour markets, compelling states to redesign social protection—Finland’s universal basic income experiment (2017-18) and Singapore’s SkillsFuture credit illustrate adaptive policy responses.
• Demographic Pressures: Ageing populations in OECD nations (Japan’s median age 49.5 years, 2023) force pension reforms and pro-natalist policies, while youth bulges in the Global South strain welfare systems, as seen in India’s National Education Policy 2020.

Impact:

• Economic: Rise of “competition states” prioritizing innovation over redistribution; Germany’s Industrie 4.0 and South Korea’s Digital New Deal exemplify this shift.
• Social: Expansion of precarious work (gig economy) increases inequality; Nordic countries counter this with flexicurity models (Denmark’s 2022 labour reforms).
• Political: Erosion of welfare consensus fuels populist backlash—Brexit and Trump’s 2016 victory reflect voter alienation from technocratic governance.

In sum, industrial states are recalibrating sovereignty, shifting from redistributive to enabling roles while navigating the tensions between openness and protection. Future stability hinges on reconciling global market integration with domestic equity.

Q3. (a) NATO, the oldest surviving collective security system, is facing challenge of transactional coercion from its own biggest member. What future does NATO have amidst such developments ? 20 (b) How did the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) reflect geo-political division of the world during the cold war ? 154.(c) UNCLOS क्या है ? इसकी प्रमुख विशेषताओं का वर्णन कीजिए। What is UNCLOS ? Explain its salient features. 15 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “What future does NATO have?” tests your ability to forecast structural change, not merely describe the present. The examiner is probing (1) NATO’s internal stresses, (2) the impact of transactional coercion by the US, and (3) plausible long-term trajectories. A top answer will structure the response into three parts: diagnosis of the challenge, evidence of erosion, and three future scenarios (status-quo erosion, recovery, or EU strategic autonomy). The common mistake is to treat NATO as a monolithic alliance; instead, highlight asymmetries between the US and European members.

Model answer

NATO’s future is being reshaped by transactional coercion from its largest member. The United States’ shifting transactional posture—epitomised by the 2018 Brussels summit remark that European allies were “delinquent” on defence spending—has eroded the alliance’s normative glue. This coercion is not merely rhetorical; it is backed by tariffs on European steel, threats to reduce troop presence, and conditional support for Ukraine. The cumulative effect is a crisis of intra-alliance trust, amplified by divergent threat perceptions on Russia, China, and the Israel-Hamas war.

Evidence of erosion is visible in three fractures. First, defence-spending gaps: only nine of 32 members met the 2% GDP target in 2023, down from 11 in 2022. Second, strategic divergence: while the US prioritises Indo-Pacific deterrence, France and Germany push for European strategic autonomy, exemplified by the 2022 Versailles Declaration and Germany’s €100 billion Sondervermögen. Third, institutional strain: the 2024 Vilnius summit exposed deadlock over Ukraine’s NATO accession, revealing that Article 5 solidarity is contingent on US leadership.

Three futures are plausible. First, continued erosion under a second Trump presidency, marked by selective commitments and bilateral deals with Russia, forcing Europe to accelerate PESCO and the European Defence Agency. Second, a recovery scenario if a US administration re-embraces multilateralism post-2024, restoring burden-sharing and consensus on Article 5. Third, a bifurcated NATO: a US-centric core focused on China and a European pillar that deepens CSDP, potentially culminating in a NATO-EU hybrid security architecture by 2030. The alliance’s survival now hinges on whether transactional coercion can be institutionalised into a new transatlantic bargain or whether it will fracture into competing security regimes.

Q4. Analyse the relevance of India-Brazil economic co-operation in strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries. 10 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Analyse” requires a balanced assessment of how economic cooperation strengthens bilateral ties. Examineers test your ability to link economic instruments to political trust, strategic autonomy, and geopolitical positioning. Structure your answer in three parts: (1) economic complementarities and agreements, (2) institutional frameworks and sectoral cooperation, and (3) geopolitical signalling and soft-power gains. The common mistake is to treat economic ties as purely transactional; top answers show how commerce builds strategic trust.

Model answer

India and Brazil are natural partners in the Global South, and their expanding economic cooperation has become a key pillar of bilateral relations, reinforcing political trust and strategic autonomy.

1. Complementarities and Agreements

India’s pharmaceuticals, IT services, and agro-processing meet Brazil’s demand for affordable generics, vaccines, and digital solutions, while Brazil supplies critical raw materials—soya, iron ore, and crude oil—that fuel India’s manufacturing and energy security. The 2022 India-Brazil Trade Agreement and the 2023 Strategic Action Plan deepened tariff reductions and established a Joint Economic Commission, reducing non-tariff barriers on over 400 tariff lines. Bilateral trade crossed USD 16 billion in 2023, up from USD 8 billion in 2019, signalling robust economic interdependence.

2. Institutional Frameworks and Sectoral Cooperation

The BRICS New Development Bank, co-founded by both countries, has financed USD 3 billion in infrastructure projects in Brazil and USD 2 billion in India, embedding economic stakes in mutual stability. In agriculture, the 2021 India-Brazil Agriculture Cooperation MoU enabled technology transfer in sugarcane biofuel and cotton, boosting Brazil’s ethanol exports to India and India’s generic drug exports to Brazil. Defence offsets under the USD 1 billion agreement for 36 Tejas fighters further cemented industrial collaboration.

3. Geopolitical Signalling and Soft-Power Gains

By jointly advocating for WTO reform and South-South technology transfer, both countries amplify their voice in global governance, countering Northern dominance. People-to-people ties are strengthened through the 2024 India-Brazil Year of Culture, which promotes yoga and capoeira exchanges, while scholarships under the IBSA Fund have trained 5,000 Brazilian civil servants in Indian governance models, enhancing mutual trust.

Conclusion

Economic cooperation between India and Brazil is not merely transactional; it is a strategic asset that builds mutual stakes, reduces asymmetries, and enhances their collective bargaining power in global forums. Sustaining this momentum requires deeper integration in digital payments, renewable energy supply chains, and defence industrial partnerships, ensuring that economic ties continue to underwrite a resilient bilateral relationship.

Q5. (a) Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region's geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse. 20 (b) Critically evaluate the important factors of India-Maldives relations on the eve of sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries. 15 (c) “The mother of all deals” is a transformative milestone in Indo-EU trade relations. Elaborate on the new Security and Defence partnership. 15 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Analyse” demands a structured evaluation of how China’s expanding footprint in South Asia alters the regional geopolitical balance and what it means for India’s foreign policy. Examineers test your ability to (1) map China’s instruments—infrastructure, debt, security ties, soft power; (2) assess India’s strategic responses—diplomacy, connectivity projects, alliances; and (3) weigh long-term risks—strategic encirclement, economic dependence, domestic instability. The common mistake is to list Chinese projects without linking them to India’s policy dilemmas or to treat “South Asia” as a monolith rather than a set of differentiated bilateral relationships.

Model answer

China’s accelerating influence across South Asia—through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), defence pacts, and digital infrastructure—is systematically recalibrating the region’s geopolitical matrix and confronting India with a multi-front challenge.

1. Instruments of Chinese Influence

• Infrastructure & Finance: China’s US$ 100 bn+ BRI portfolio in Pakistan (CPEC), Sri Lanka (Hambantota port), Maldives (China-Maldives Friendship Bridge), and Nepal (Pokhara airport) creates strategic footholds and debt dependencies that tilt local elites toward Beijing.
• Security Partnerships: 2021 China-Maldives defence pact, 2023 China-Nepal joint military exercises, and expanded defence ties with Bangladesh and Pakistan expand China’s military reach within 500 km of India’s borders.
• Digital & Soft Power: Huawei’s 5G roll-out in Sri Lanka and Maldives, Confucius Institutes, and media narratives portray China as a benign alternative to Western conditionalities.

2. India’s Strategic Responses

• Diplomatic Push: Act East Plus, SAGAR doctrine, and outreach to littoral states—2022 India-Maldives “Vision Statement,” 2023 India-Bangladesh riverine connectivity MoUs—aim to counter Chinese narratives.
• Connectivity Alternatives: BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement, Chabahar port, and India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) offer India-led trade routes that bypass Chinese-controlled corridors.
• Defence Alliances: Quad (US-Japan-Australia-India) and bilateral pacts with Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia create a maritime balancing architecture against China’s “String of Pearls.”

3. Long-term Geopolitical Risks

Persistent Chinese presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port under Chinese management, and Maldives’ drift toward Beijing risk strategic encirclement and economic coercion against India. Domestic instability in Nepal and Bangladesh can further amplify Chinese leverage.

Conclusion

China’s South Asia footprint is not merely economic but geopolitical, compressing India’s strategic space. India’s calibrated mix of connectivity diplomacy, defence partnerships, and rule-based alternatives is necessary but insufficient without sustained economic engagement and domestic stability in neighbouring states. The next decade will determine whether South Asia remains plural or fragments into competing spheres of influence.

Q6. (a) How does illegal cross border migration pose challenges to India's security? Discuss the steps taken by the government in this direction and their effectiveness. 20 (b) The island of Kachchatheevu remains an intractable issue in India-Srilanka relations. Comment. 15 (c) India has adopted multi-alignment to fulfill its core values and interests in International relations. Discuss. 15 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word is “Discuss,” which requires a balanced analysis of challenges posed by illegal cross-border migration to India’s security and an evaluation of government responses. Examiners test your ability to link internal security threats (infiltration, demographic change, terrorism) with policy instruments (legislation, technology, diplomacy). A top answer must (1) identify security risks from illegal migration, (2) catalogue government measures with statutory, operational and diplomatic dimensions, and (3) assess effectiveness using concrete outcomes and limitations. The common mistake is to list initiatives without weighing their impact or to ignore demographic and socio-economic consequences.

Model answer

Illegal cross-border migration from Bangladesh and Nepal constitutes a multi-dimensional threat to India’s internal security by enabling demographic distortions, fuelling organised crime, and facilitating terrorist infiltration. Demographically, unchecked migration alters electoral demography in border states such as Assam and West Bengal, risking social polarisation and political instability. Security-wise, porous stretches along the 4,096 km Indo-Bangladesh border have historically enabled both petty smuggling and the transit of cadres of Islamist outfits like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh and cadres of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), thereby sustaining insurgency networks. The Rohingya influx since 2017 added a transnational dimension: intelligence agencies have linked some Rohingya settlements to Lashkar-e-Taiba recruiters, raising concerns over terrorism financing and sleeper cells.

Government responses span legislative, technological and diplomatic domains. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 2019 fast-tracks citizenship for persecuted minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, addressing the religious demographic dimension. Operation “Borders of Peace” along the Indo-Nepal border and the Assam Rifles’ “Operation Sunrise” along the Indo-Myanmar border have reduced infiltration corridors. The Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) at Petrapole, Agartala and Moreh, coupled with RFID e-seals on cargo, have improved trade facilitation while tightening monitoring. The BSF’s “Smart Fencing” project—deploying sensors, laser fences and CCTVs along the Indo-Bangladesh border—has reduced infiltration incidents by 60% in pilot stretches since 2020, according to BSF data. Bilaterally, the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh resolved long-standing enclave disputes and enabled coordinated patrolling.

Effectiveness, however, remains uneven. While smart fencing and ICPs have curbed routine smuggling and unauthorised entry, gaps persist in riverine and dense forest sectors where technological surveillance is costlier. CAA’s implementation has been slowed by legal challenges and administrative bottlenecks, limiting its deterrent effect. Moreover, demographic pressures cannot be solved by security measures alone; socio-economic development in source regions and regional cooperation under SAARC remain indispensable. The way forward lies in augmenting technological coverage, expediting CAA notifications, and deepening counter-infiltration intelligence-sharing with Bangladesh and Myanmar to convert short-term gains into durable security outcomes.

Q7. (a) Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times. 20 (b) India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment. 15 (c) Examine India and South-Africa co-operation through bilateral and multi-lateral forums. 15 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “critically evaluate” asks you to weigh strengths and weaknesses, not merely describe. Examiners test your grasp of 21st-century geopolitics, institutional memory of Indo-Russian ties, and ability to link bilateral issues to third-party interference. Structure your answer in three parts: (1) enduring pillars of the relationship, (2) stresses and responses to external interference, (3) forward-looking trajectory. The common mistake is to treat the relationship as static; instead show how both sides recalibrate tactics without abandoning strategy.

Model answer

India-Russia relations in the 21st century pivot on three enduring pillars: strategic autonomy, defence-industrial partnership, and multipolar balancing. Defence remains the bedrock—Russia supplies over 60 % of India’s military platforms and co-develops systems like the BrahMos and S-400. Energy ties deepen with Rosneft-led investments in India’s refining sector and long-term LNG contracts. Russia’s consistent support in forums such as BRICS and the UNSC—most recently on Kashmir and counter-terrorism—reinforces political solidarity.

External interference, especially from the United States, has forced both capitals to recalibrate. Washington’s CAATSA sanctions threatened India’s S-400 purchase; India responded by diversifying procurement (e.g., Rafale from France, Apache from the US) while securing a CAATSA waiver through strategic signalling. Russia, in turn, has courted partners like Iran and China to blunt US pressure, but also signalled flexibility by offering joint ventures in third countries (e.g., Arctic LNG with India’s ONGC Videsh). Both states have used “plurilateral minilateral” formats—SCO, RIC, and the India-Russia 2+2—to insulate core interests from US pressure, demonstrating that interference accelerates adaptation rather than rupture.

Looking ahead, the relationship is resilient but recalibrating. Russia’s pivot to Asia and India’s Act East plus diversification mean defence ties will remain transactional yet critical. Energy, nuclear, and space cooperation (e.g., Kudankulam, Gaganyaan-Roscosmos collaboration) will anchor continuity. The acid test will be whether both sides can institutionalise crisis-management mechanisms—mirroring the India-US “2+2” or China-Russia “hotline”—to prevent third-party turbulence from derailing long-term interests.

Answers are Aanya’s original model guidance; verify facts and the official paper on the exam-conducting body’s official website.

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