24 Jul Failure Developing Societies to Evolve into Proto-Modern and Ortho -Modern Systems: A Comparative Public Administration Perspective

Introduction

The emergence of newly independent nations after the Second World War marked a new phase in the study of Comparative Public Administration (CPA). Most countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America adopted modern constitutional frameworks, including parliamentary or presidential systems of government, with the expectation that they would gradually transform into stable modern democracies. These institutional arrangements were expected to produce what Fred W. Riggs described as proto-modern and eventually ortho-modern societies.

However, the experience of many developing countries differed significantly from these expectations. Instead of evolving into stable constitutional democracies with professional administrative systems, many countries witnessed the emergence of populist political systems or bureaucratic (often military-bureaucratic) regimes. Riggs sought to explain this divergence through his comparative analysis of administrative systems. His arguments, later discussed in the globalization perspective by Lyndon A. Otenyo and Nancy S. Lind, remain highly relevant for understanding governance in developing societies.

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Riggs’ Central Argument

Riggs did not argue that parliamentary or presidential systems were inherently unsuitable for developing countries. Rather, he maintained that these institutions were frequently transplanted from advanced Western democracies into societies that lacked the social, economic, political and administrative foundations required for their successful functioning.

Consequently, although modern constitutions and administrative structures existed formally, they often failed to function as intended. The gap between formal institutions and actual political practice became one of the defining features of many developing societies.

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Reasons for the Failure of Proto-Modern and Ortho-Modern Development

1. Transplantation of Western Institutions

Most newly independent states adopted constitutions modeled on Britain, the United States or France. Parliamentary democracy, presidential government, judicial review, civil service commissions and constitutional rights were introduced with the expectation that they would automatically generate democratic governance.

Riggs argued that institutions cannot simply be copied from one society to another. Successful institutions evolve gradually within a particular historical, cultural and economic environment. In many developing countries, these supporting conditions were absent.

As a result, constitutional provisions often existed only on paper while actual governance continued to operate through informal networks, personal relationships and patronage.

Riggs described this phenomenon as formalism—the difference between officially prescribed rules and actual administrative behaviour.

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2. Weak Administrative Capacity

Modern democratic institutions require an efficient and politically neutral bureaucracy. In many developing countries, however, public administration remained weak.

Common problems included:

• politically influenced recruitment,
• inadequate professional training,
• corruption,
• patronage,
• shortage of skilled personnel,
• excessive political interference.

Without an effective bureaucracy, governments found it difficult to implement policies or provide public services, reducing public confidence in democratic institutions.

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3. Coexistence of Traditional and Modern Values

Riggs observed that developing societies were characterized by the simultaneous existence of traditional and modern institutions.

Traditional authority based on kinship, caste, tribe, ethnicity or religion frequently coexisted with modern constitutional principles such as equality before law and merit-based recruitment.

This institutional overlap created administrative inconsistency and weakened the effectiveness of modern governance.

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4. Rapid Political Mobilization

Independence encouraged greater political participation. Citizens demanded employment, education, land reforms, healthcare and welfare.

However, administrative institutions developed much more slowly than political participation.

Governments were therefore unable to meet rapidly expanding public expectations, resulting in political dissatisfaction, instability and declining confidence in democratic institutions.

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5. Economic Underdevelopment

Economic weakness significantly constrained administrative modernization.

Many governments lacked sufficient financial resources to:

• strengthen public administration,
• expand social services,
• improve infrastructure,
• invest in administrative reforms.

Economic crises frequently intensified political instability and weakened democratic governments.

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6. Colonial Administrative Legacy

Colonial administrations were primarily designed to maintain law and order, collect taxes and protect imperial interests rather than promote democratic governance.

After independence, many countries inherited highly centralized bureaucratic structures that were poorly suited for participatory democracy.

These colonial administrative traditions often persisted long after political independence.

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7. Absence of Institutional Maturity

Riggs emphasized that successful modern democracies possess several institutional characteristics:

• stable political parties,
• independent judiciary,
• rule of law,
• professional civil service,
• administrative accountability,
• political tolerance,
• strong civic culture.

Many developing societies had not yet developed these institutional foundations. Consequently, constitutional systems remained fragile.

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Emergence of Populist Systems

Where democratic institutions proved weak, charismatic political leaders often emerged claiming to represent “the people” directly.

Such leaders frequently concentrated political authority in the executive while weakening institutional checks and balances.

Characteristics of populist systems include:

• personalized leadership,
• direct appeal to the masses,
• weakened legislatures,
• politicization of administration,
• erosion of judicial independence,
• concentration of executive power.

Although elections may continue, institutional accountability often declines.

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Emergence of Bureaucratic Systems

In several countries, repeated political crises led military organizations or senior bureaucrats to intervene in government.

They justified intervention on the grounds of restoring political order, ensuring national unity and promoting economic development.

These bureaucratic or military-bureaucratic regimes generally displayed:

• centralized authority,
• dominant bureaucracy or military,
• limited political competition,
• emphasis on stability over participation,
• administrative control over political decision-making.

Riggs regarded these systems as alternative outcomes of unsuccessful democratic institutionalization.

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Impact of Globalization

According to the globalization perspective discussed by Otenyo and Lind, globalization introduced new administrative reforms including:

• New Public Management,
• decentralization,
• privatization,
• digital governance,
• performance-based management.

However, globalization did not eliminate domestic institutional weaknesses.

Countries possessing strong administrative institutions generally implemented these reforms successfully.

In contrast, countries with weak institutions often experienced implementation failures, increasing inequality, administrative fragmentation and reduced state capacity.

Thus, globalization accelerated administrative change but could not substitute for strong domestic institutions.

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Contemporary Relevance

Riggs’ analysis continues to explain why countries adopting similar constitutional systems frequently experience very different political outcomes.

Some developing countries have gradually strengthened democratic institutions through sustained reforms, professional civil services and economic development. Others continue to struggle with institutional weakness, populism or bureaucratic dominance.

The framework therefore remains valuable for analysing governance reforms, state capacity and administrative development in the contemporary world.

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Critical Evaluation

Riggs’ framework provides one of the earliest systematic explanations of administrative development in transitional societies.

Strengths

• Explains why identical constitutional models produce different outcomes.
• Highlights the importance of administrative capacity and institutional development.
• Demonstrates that modernization is context-specific rather than universal.
• Remains relevant for understanding governance under globalization.

Limitations

• The distinction between proto-modern and ortho-modern societies is analytical rather than absolute.
• Globalization, technological change and regional integration have created new governance models not fully anticipated by Riggs.
• Several countries have successfully transitioned from weak institutions to stable democracies, indicating that institutional outcomes are neither fixed nor predetermined.

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Conclusion

Fred W. Riggs argued that the difficulties experienced by many developing societies were not primarily the result of adopting parliamentary or presidential constitutions. Rather, they stemmed from a mismatch between imported political institutions and the underlying social, economic and administrative realities of those societies. Where institutional capacity remained weak, constitutional democracy often gave way to populist leadership or bureaucratic domination.

The insights presented by Riggs, and later revisited in the globalization literature edited by Lyndon A. Otenyo and Nancy S. Lind, continue to offer an important framework for understanding comparative public administration. They remind scholars and practitioners that successful democratic governance depends not merely on constitutional design but on the gradual development of capable institutions, professional administration, rule of law and supportive socio-economic conditions.