08 Sep UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 — Law Optional Paper I: Questions with Model Answers | Plutus IAS
The questions below are from Law Optional Paper I of UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 (held 2026-08-30) — the actual paper, which is public. Each carries a model answer written by Aanya in Plutus IAS teaching style, to the marks and word limit.
Official source: official (upsc.gov.in).
Q1. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) “The ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’ in its absolute unrestricted application does not exist in India.” Elucidate with regard to service jurisprudence. (b) “If the power of judicial review of legislation and administrative actions is abrogated or taken away, the Constitution will cease to be what it is.” Critically evaluate. (c) What do you understand by legislative process? Under the Constitution, the Parliament has been empowered to make law on any matter, in any list, for any territory not included in a State. Explain. (d) The word ‘State’ used in the ‘Directive Principles’ has the same meaning as has been given to it by Article 12, for the purposes of enforcement of the Fundamental Rights. Examine in the light of exceptions, if any. (e) The President in India is elected not directly by the people, but by the method of indirect election. Explain. Who will decide in case any dispute arises in connection with the election of the President? Discuss. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “Elucidate” asks for a reasoned explanation, not mere description. The examiner is testing your grasp of constitutional theory, judicial interpretations, and the limits placed on executive power. A top answer must (1) define the doctrine, (2) show how Indian courts have restricted it, and (3) cite landmark cases and constitutional safeguards. The common mistake is to treat the doctrine as absolute and ignore the role of Articles 310–311, the basic structure doctrine, and judicial review.
Model answer
The ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’ in India is statutorily recognised under Article 310, which states that civil servants hold office “during the pleasure of the President or Governor.” However, the doctrine is not absolute; it is subject to constitutional and statutory safeguards that transform it into a conditional tenure.
First, Articles 310–311 read with Articles 14, 16 and 21 guarantee equality, due process and protection against arbitrary dismissal. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985), the Supreme Court held that the pleasure doctrine must be read with Articles 14 and 21, thereby importing fairness and reasonableness. Second, the President and Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, ensuring parliamentary accountability. Third, statutory protection under service rules, departmental inquiries and judicial review curbs executive arbitrariness.
Landmark cases such as Dhingra v. Union of India (1958) and Modi Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) affirm that termination must follow due process and cannot be mala fide. Thus, the doctrine operates within a constitutional framework, rendering its unrestricted application constitutionally impermissible.
Q2. (a) “While interpreting Article 21 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of ‘due process of law’ indirectly into the Constitution of India, and thereby expanded its scope considerably.” Support your answer with the help of leading case laws. (b) “Constitutionalism’ connotes in essence—‘limited government’ or ‘a limitation on government’. It is the antithesis of arbitrary powers.” Discuss. (c) “The Legislature itself must set the essential policy, or lay down standards or policy in the Delegating Act and the delegate would then legislate to advance the legislative policy.” Elaborate the statement with the help of relevant case laws. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “Support” in part (a) demands a clear exposition of how the Supreme Court transformed Article 21 from a procedural guarantee into a substantive protection by importing the due-process idea without ever naming it. The examiner tests your grasp of judicial creativity and landmark precedents. Structure your answer in three parts: (i) brief background on the pre-Maneka era, (ii) the Maneka shift and subsequent expansion through privacy and habeas corpus cases, and (iii) a concluding sentence on the cumulative effect. The common mistake is to stop at Maneka Gandhi and omit later doctrinal expansions such as privacy under Puttaswamy (2017) and the habeas corpus jurisprudence in ADM Jabalpur (1976) reversal.
Model answer
The Supreme Court, while interpreting Article 21, quietly infused the philosophy of ‘due process of law’ into the Constitution, thereby converting a narrow procedural safeguard into a robust substantive guarantee of life and personal liberty.
Pre-Maneka era and the A.K. Gopalan shift: In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Court read Article 21 as embodying only the principle of “procedure established by law,” thereby insulating legislative acts from substantive fairness review.
The Maneka Gandhi watershed (1978): Overruling A.K. Gopalan, the seven-judge bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India held that any law depriving a person of “life” or “personal liberty” must be not only procedurally fair but also substantively “fair, just and reasonable.” This amounted to an indirect adoption of due-process doctrine, even though the Constitution textually uses “procedure established by law.”
Doctrinal expansion thereafter: The Court deepened this due-process scrutiny in subsequent cases. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1963), it read a right to privacy into Article 21. Later, in Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975), the Court anchored privacy as part of personal liberty. Finally, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench unanimously declared informational privacy a facet of Article 21, requiring laws to meet a proportionality test—essentially a due-process standard. The habeas corpus jurisprudence culminating in the reversal of ADM Jabalpur (1976) in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (2007) further entrenched substantive fairness as a constitutional minimum.
Thus, through judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has effectively introduced due process of law into Article 21, converting a procedural shield into a substantive bulwark against arbitrary state action.
Q3. (a) Keshavananda illustrates judicial creativity and the policy-making role of the Supreme Court of a very high order and could be regarded to be an improvement over the formulation in Golaknath. Examine with the help of relevant arguments. (b) ‘Constitutional governance’ is a system where government authority is limited, defined and structured by a supreme written or unwritten constitution. Analyze with special reference to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. (c) “The concept of ‘natural justice’ is of variable content and imposes variable procedural norms from case to case.” Explain. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word is examine, so the examiner wants a critical analysis, not mere description. The question tests understanding of judicial activism in landmark constitutional cases (Golaknath vs. State of Punjab and Keshavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala), the doctrine of basic structure, and the policy-making role of the Supreme Court. A top answer must (1) contrast Golaknath’s rigid position with Keshavananda’s flexible basic-structure doctrine, (2) highlight judicial creativity and policy-making through the basic-structure test, and (3) illustrate with key judgments and constitutional provisions. The common mistake is to treat Keshavananda only as a case on amendment power without linking it to judicial policy-making or to ignore Golaknath’s foundational role.
Model answer
Judicial creativity and policy-making in Keshavananda Bharati
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) marks a watershed in Indian constitutional adjudication by elevating judicial policy-making to a constitutional doctrine. Where Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) had frozen fundamental rights against parliamentary amendment, Keshavananda Bharati introduced the basic structure doctrine, allowing judicial review of constitutional amendments to protect the “essential features” of the Constitution. This shift transformed the Supreme Court from a mere interpreter to a constitutional architect, balancing parliamentary sovereignty with constitutional supremacy.
The Court’s creativity is evident in its procedural innovation. Instead of striking down the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments wholesale, it carved out a judicial test—the basic structure doctrine—that could invalidate amendments only when they damaged the Constitution’s “basic structure.” This flexible standard enabled the Court to protect federalism, secularism, and judicial independence while permitting legitimate amendments. The 13-judge bench decision (7:6 majority) itself reflects institutional consensus-building, a hallmark of judicial policy-making.
Illustratively, the doctrine has been used to strike down amendments that undermined federal balance (e.g., Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1980) and judicial review (Waman Rao v. Union of India, 1981). By embedding judicial values into the Constitution’s fabric, Keshavananda Bharati institutionalized a living constitution approach, where the Court periodically redefines constitutional limits in response to evolving governance needs.
In sum, Keshavananda Bharati exemplifies judicial creativity that transcends adjudication, embedding policy choices into constitutional law and ensuring the Constitution remains a dynamic instrument of governance.
Q4. (a) “The Supreme Court of India is a multi-jurisdictional Court and may be regarded as the most powerful Apex Court in the world.” Justify this statement supported by relevant constitutional provisions. (b) “It is the satisfaction of the President and not of the Central Cabinet, for proclamation of emergency in India.” Do you agree with it? Critically examine and also, discuss about the consequences of such proclamation. (c) “An ‘Ombudsman’ is the projection of the legislative function of supervising the administration.” Elucidate this statement in Indian perspectives with the help of examples. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “justify” in part (a) requires you to establish the Supreme Court’s multi-jurisdictional character and global pre-eminence using constitutional provisions. Examine Articles 32, 136, 141, 142 and 226 to show how the Court exercises writ, appellate, advisory, curative and supervisory jurisdictions. The common mistake is to stop at Article 32 and ignore the other jurisdictions that give the Court its extraordinary power.
Model answer
The Supreme Court of India is a multi-jurisdictional court and may indeed be regarded as the most powerful apex court in the world. Its power emanates from a combination of original, appellate, advisory, writ, review and curative jurisdictions enshrined in the Constitution.
Original Jurisdiction (Article 131) empowers the Court to adjudicate disputes between the Union and States or between States inter se, a feature unique to federal apex courts.
Appellate Jurisdiction (Articles 132-134, 136) allows the Court to hear appeals on constitutional, civil and criminal matters, including special leave petitions under Article 136 that bypass all prior forums, a power unmatched in most apex courts.
Writ Jurisdiction (Article 32) is the Court’s extraordinary tool to enforce fundamental rights, enabling it to issue directions, orders or writs for any purpose, a jurisdiction described by Dr. Ambedkar as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution.
Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 143) enables the President to seek the Court’s opinion on questions of law or fact, reinforcing its advisory supremacy.
Supervisory and Review Jurisdictions (Articles 141, 142) bind all courts to the Supreme Court’s law laid down and empower it to pass any order necessary for complete justice, including suo motu interventions and contempt proceedings.
These overlapping jurisdictions make the Supreme Court a multi-jurisdictional institution whose writ runs across the legal landscape of India, justifying its description as the most powerful apex court globally.
Q5. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) Whether International Law is a law in the true sense of the term ‘law’ or not? Examine. (b) Critically examine the theories which have been propounded to explain the relationship between International Law and Municipal Law. (c) What is 'asylum'? Is 'Right to Asylum' a fundamental right of a person in other country to save from prosecution? Explain. (d) What do you mean by imposing 'Double Veto' by a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations? Also, discuss its impact on decision-making process of the United Nations. (e) What do you understand by 'State succession' and 'State recognition'? Differentiate between them. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word ‘Examine’ asks for a reasoned evaluation rather than mere description. The examiner is testing (i) conceptual clarity on whether International Law qualifies as ‘law’, (ii) analytical grasp of monist-dualist theories and their Indian practice, and (iii) ability to distinguish between related doctrines. A top answer must structure the response in three parts: define International Law, present the rival theories with examples/cases, and critically assess their validity. The common mistake is to treat International Law as purely moral or political, ignoring its legal character and domestic enforcement mechanisms.
Model answer
International Law as ‘Law’ in the True Sense
International Law is law in the strict sense because it possesses three essential elements: a rule-making authority (States and international organisations), a body of binding norms (treaties, customary rules, general principles), and compulsory settlement mechanisms (ICJ, WTO dispute settlement, ICC). The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case (1927) held that International Law is binding because States consent to it and observe it as law. Domestic courts, including the Indian Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), have treated ratified treaties as part of municipal law under Article 253 and Article 51(c), demonstrating that International Law is enforceable in national jurisdictions.
Critics argue that International Law lacks a central legislature and sanctions. However, the UN Charter (Chapter VII) empowers the Security Council to impose binding measures, while the International Criminal Court can issue arrest warrants, thus providing enforcement teeth. Therefore, International Law meets the criteria of ‘law’—rules, authority, and sanction—even if decentralised.
Conclusion: International Law is law in the true sense, recognised by States, enforced domestically, and backed by international adjudicatory and coercive mechanisms, despite its distinctive features.
Q6. (a) "The present world economic order is supposed to be guided by the operation of free market forces propelled by free competition, based on free movement of goods and services including technology." Discuss the role of the principle of non-discrimination and free trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in this regard. (b) Discuss the grounds of 'intervention' and its types. State the circumstances under which lawful recourse to use of force for self-defence could be taken. Give its limitations also. (c) “International Law may be defined as that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which States feel themselves bound to observe and, therefore, do commonly observe in their relation to each other.” Explain. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “Discuss” requires a balanced analysis of the GATT’s non-discrimination and free-trade principles, followed by an explanation of intervention grounds, types, and the lawful use of force in self-defence with its limits. Examiners test understanding of treaty provisions, judicial precedents, and the Charter exceptions. The common mistake is to treat the three sub-parts as isolated topics rather than weaving them into a coherent narrative of international economic and security law.
Model answer
The present world economic order is indeed predicated on the idea that free market forces, driven by competition and the free movement of goods, services, and technology, will deliver prosperity. Yet this liberal vision is not self-executing; it relies on binding legal disciplines. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) embeds two cardinal principles—non-discrimination and free trade—to discipline unilateral protectionism and create a predictable, rules-based system.
Non-discrimination operates through two pillars: Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment (Article I) and National Treatment (Article III). MFN obliges members to extend any trade advantage granted to one trading partner to all others, preventing bilateral deals from fracturing the multilateral edifice. National Treatment prohibits internal taxes and regulations from favouring domestic products over like imported ones once they have cleared customs. These rules were operationalised in landmark disputes such as Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), where the Appellate Body read “likeness” expansively to curb disguised protectionism. The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp (1998) further clarified that even non-trade objectives—like environmental protection—must comply with GATT disciplines if they discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably, illustrating how non-discrimination tempers unilateral policy space.
Free trade is advanced through tariff bindings and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (Article XI). Tariff schedules bind members’ applied rates, creating tariff ceilings; any increase beyond the bound rate triggers compensation or retaliation under Article XXVIII. The elimination of quotas—seen in the EC – Bananas III (2001) ruling against EU import licensing—reinforces predictability. Together, these disciplines reduce transaction costs, deter beggar-thy-neighbour policies, and anchor the multilateral trading system even amid geopolitical tensions.
In the security realm, intervention and the use of force remain contested. Grounds of intervention include consent, countermeasures, protection of nationals, and humanitarian intervention—though the last is controversial and lacks explicit Charter authority. Self-defence, codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, is lawful only when an armed attack occurs, the response is necessary and proportional, and the Security Council is immediately notified. The ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) read these conditions strictly, rejecting anticipatory self-defence unless the attack is imminent. Limitations are equally strict: self-defence cannot be invoked for economic coercion, nor can it be used to achieve regime change; collective self-defence requires a request from the victim state. These constraints prevent abuse while preserving the Charter’s central prohibition of force under Article 2(4).
International law, therefore, functions as the grammar that converts power into predictable cooperation. By disciplining discrimination and restricting recourse to force, it sustains both the market’s promise and the peace that underwrites it.
Q7. (a) Discuss the facts and the Principles of the Law of the Sea, emerged in ‘Corfu Channel Case’, with reference to the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Give your opinion, how far the ‘Strait of Hormuz’ problem could be resolved under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) in the light of the principle of ‘innocent passage’ by foreign vessels. Explain. (b) Discuss the composition, powers and functions of the Security Council of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. (c) Define the term ‘nationality’. State the various modes of acquisition of nationality by a person. Differentiate between ‘nationality’ and ‘domicile’. (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “Discuss” demands a structured, analytical response that explains facts, principles, and opinions with legal reasoning. The examiner is testing your grasp of (a) the Law of the Sea as crystallised in the Corfu Channel Case, (b) the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 and the doctrine of innocent passage, and (c) the composition, powers and functions of the UN Security Council. A top answer must have three parts: (1) concise statement of facts and ICJ ratio in Corfu Channel, (2) exposition of the territorial sea and contiguous zone under UNCLOS, and (3) a forward-looking opinion on Strait of Hormuz using innocent-passage rules. The common mistake is to stop at descriptive recitation of UNCLOS articles without linking them to the factual scenario or the ICJ’s legal reasoning.
Model answer
Facts and Principles in the Corfu Channel Case (1949): The ICJ ruled on 9 April 1949 that the laying of mines in Albanian territorial waters, causing damage to two British destroyers, violated Albania’s obligation under international law to notify the existence of such dangers. The Court held that Albania had exclusive control over its territorial sea and that foreign warships enjoyed the right of innocent passage subject to the coastal state’s laws and regulations. This case crystallised two cardinal principles: (i) the territorial sea is under the sovereignty of the coastal state, and (ii) innocent passage is a residual right that must not prejudice the coastal state’s peace, good order or security.
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under UNCLOS, 1982: UNCLOS fixes the breadth of the territorial sea at up to 12 nautical miles measured from baselines (Article 3). Within this belt, the coastal state exercises full sovereignty subject to the right of innocent passage (Article 17). The contiguous zone extends up to 24 nautical miles from baselines; here the coastal state may exercise limited control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws (Article 33). The Corfu Channel ratio is embedded in Article 19, which defines “innocent passage” as not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.
Opinion on Strait of Hormuz under UNCLOS: The Strait is a narrow international strait used for international navigation connecting two parts of the high seas. Under Article 38, all ships and aircraft enjoy unimpeded transit passage, a higher freedom than innocent passage. However, if a vessel is merely transiting without exercising transit passage (e.g., warships on innocent passage), it must comply with Articles 19 and 21. Any attempt by Iran or any littoral state to suspend innocent passage in the absence of a threat to its peace, good order or security would violate UNCLOS. The Hormuz problem is best resolved through compulsory dispute settlement under Part XV, especially Annex VII arbitration, combined with confidence-building measures such as prior notification of naval exercises and joint maritime domain awareness patrols.
Conclusion: The Corfu Channel Case remains the foundational authority on coastal-state rights and innocent passage. UNCLOS, 1982, refines these principles and offers a robust framework—especially transit passage in straits used for international navigation—to keep Hormuz open and secure. The key is strict adherence to the legal tests of “innocent passage” and the compulsory dispute settlement machinery of UNCLOS.
Q8. (a) “The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944 adopted the statutes of two institutions to promote New International Economic Order for international financial cooperation and economic development.” Discuss the above statement in terms of the International Forum. (b) Discuss briefly 'pre and post' developments of Kyoto Environment Summit on Global Warming, 1997 for the protection and improvement of the human environment. (c) What do you mean by Human Rights? Discuss the procedure for the enforcement of Human Rights of a person as laid down under the International Law. ★★★ SB27—606 (15 marks)
How to approach this question
The directive word “Discuss” requires a multi-layered answer: first, explain the Bretton Woods Conference’s purpose and outcomes; second, trace pre- and post-Kyoto developments on global warming; third, define human rights and outline enforcement mechanisms under international law. Examiners test your grasp of institutional history, environmental diplomacy, and human-rights jurisprudence. The common mistake is to treat each sub-question in isolation; instead, weave them into a coherent narrative that shows cause-and-effect across the three domains.
Model answer
The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944, attended by 44 Allied nations during World War II, was convened to prevent a recurrence of the Great Depression and to build a stable post-war economic order. The Conference adopted the Articles of Agreement of two pivotal institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now part of the World Bank Group). The IMF was tasked with promoting monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and the issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as reserve assets, while the IBRD focused on reconstruction and long-term development financing. Together, these institutions institutionalised a liberal international economic order aimed at fostering global financial cooperation and economic development.
The 1997 Kyoto Environment Summit marked a watershed in climate governance. Pre-Kyoto efforts, such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1987 Montreal Protocol, laid foundational norms on environmental protection. Kyoto introduced legally binding emission reduction targets for Annex I countries through the Kyoto Protocol, operationalising the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” Post-Kyoto developments include the 2015 Paris Agreement, which replaced top-down targets with nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and introduced a global stocktake mechanism. Subsequent COP decisions have expanded climate finance, technology transfer, and just transition frameworks, reflecting a shift from mitigation-only to integrated climate-resilient development strategies.
Human rights are universal, indivisible, and inalienable entitlements inherent to all persons by virtue of their humanity. Under international law, enforcement proceeds through multiple avenues: universal periodic review by the Human Rights Council, individual complaints mechanisms under ICCPR Optional Protocol I, regional human-rights courts such as the ECtHR and IACtHR, and domestic incorporation via constitutional bills of rights. The UN Human Rights Committee adjudicates communications alleging violations, while special rapporteurs monitor thematic and country situations. States remain the primary duty-bearers, yet non-state actors and transnational corporations are increasingly held accountable through the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. This layered architecture underscores the dynamic evolution from abstract declarations to practical remedies in the protection and promotion of human dignity.
Answers are Aanya’s original model guidance; verify facts and the official paper on the exam-conducting body’s official website.
Related — other papers of this exam
- All papers — UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 hub
- Essay (Paper-I) — questions & model answers
- General Studies-I (Paper-II) — questions & model answers
- General Studies-II (Paper-III) — questions & model answers
- General Studies-III (Paper-IV) — questions & model answers
- General Studies-IV (Paper-V) — questions & model answers
- Law Optional Paper II — questions & model answers
- NAMASTE Scheme: Enhancing Sanitation Workers’ Livelihoods & Safety - November 14, 2026
- एमएसएमई का विशेष अभियान 6.0: स्वच्छता और लंबित मामलों का निपटारा - November 14, 2026
- Sea Vigil-26: Coastal Defence Drills Off Visakhapatnam - November 14, 2026

No Comments