UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 — Law Optional Paper I: Questions with Model Answers | Plutus IAS

08 Sep UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 — Law Optional Paper I: Questions with Model Answers | Plutus IAS

The questions below are from Law Optional Paper I of UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 (held 2026-08-30) — the actual paper, which is public. Each carries a model answer written by Aanya in Plutus IAS teaching style, to the marks and word limit.

Official source: official (upsc.gov.in).

Q1. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) “The ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’ in its absolute unrestricted application does not exist in India.” Elucidate with regard to service jurisprudence. (b) “If the power of judicial review of legislation and administrative actions is abrogated or taken away, the Constitution will cease to be what it is.” Critically evaluate. (c) What do you understand by legislative process? Under the Constitution, the Parliament has been empowered to make law on any matter, in any list, for any territory not included in a State. Explain. (d) The word ‘State’ used in the ‘Directive Principles’ has the same meaning as has been given to it by Article 12, for the purposes of enforcement of the Fundamental Rights. Examine in the light of exceptions, if any. (e) The President in India is elected not directly by the people, but by the method of indirect election. Explain. Who will decide in case any dispute arises in connection with the election of the President? Discuss. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Elucidate” asks for a reasoned explanation, not mere description. The examiner is testing your grasp of constitutional theory, judicial interpretations, and the limits placed on executive power. A top answer must (1) define the doctrine, (2) show how Indian courts have restricted it, and (3) cite landmark cases and constitutional safeguards. The common mistake is to treat the doctrine as absolute and ignore the role of Articles 310–311, the basic structure doctrine, and judicial review.

Model answer

The ‘Doctrine of Pleasure’ in India is statutorily recognised under Article 310, which states that civil servants hold office “during the pleasure of the President or Governor.” However, the doctrine is not absolute; it is subject to constitutional and statutory safeguards that transform it into a conditional tenure.

First, Articles 310–311 read with Articles 14, 16 and 21 guarantee equality, due process and protection against arbitrary dismissal. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985), the Supreme Court held that the pleasure doctrine must be read with Articles 14 and 21, thereby importing fairness and reasonableness. Second, the President and Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, ensuring parliamentary accountability. Third, statutory protection under service rules, departmental inquiries and judicial review curbs executive arbitrariness.

Landmark cases such as Dhingra v. Union of India (1958) and Modi Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) affirm that termination must follow due process and cannot be mala fide. Thus, the doctrine operates within a constitutional framework, rendering its unrestricted application constitutionally impermissible.

Q2. (a) “While interpreting Article 21 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of ‘due process of law’ indirectly into the Constitution of India, and thereby expanded its scope considerably.” Support your answer with the help of leading case laws. (b) “Constitutionalism’ connotes in essence—‘limited government’ or ‘a limitation on government’. It is the antithesis of arbitrary powers.” Discuss. (c) “The Legislature itself must set the essential policy, or lay down standards or policy in the Delegating Act and the delegate would then legislate to advance the legislative policy.” Elaborate the statement with the help of relevant case laws. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Support” in part (a) demands a clear exposition of how the Supreme Court transformed Article 21 from a procedural guarantee into a substantive protection by importing the due-process idea without ever naming it. The examiner tests your grasp of judicial creativity and landmark precedents. Structure your answer in three parts: (i) brief background on the pre-Maneka era, (ii) the Maneka shift and subsequent expansion through privacy and habeas corpus cases, and (iii) a concluding sentence on the cumulative effect. The common mistake is to stop at Maneka Gandhi and omit later doctrinal expansions such as privacy under Puttaswamy (2017) and the habeas corpus jurisprudence in ADM Jabalpur (1976) reversal.

Model answer

The Supreme Court, while interpreting Article 21, quietly infused the philosophy of ‘due process of law’ into the Constitution, thereby converting a narrow procedural safeguard into a robust substantive guarantee of life and personal liberty.

Pre-Maneka era and the A.K. Gopalan shift: In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Court read Article 21 as embodying only the principle of “procedure established by law,” thereby insulating legislative acts from substantive fairness review.

The Maneka Gandhi watershed (1978): Overruling A.K. Gopalan, the seven-judge bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India held that any law depriving a person of “life” or “personal liberty” must be not only procedurally fair but also substantively “fair, just and reasonable.” This amounted to an indirect adoption of due-process doctrine, even though the Constitution textually uses “procedure established by law.”

Doctrinal expansion thereafter: The Court deepened this due-process scrutiny in subsequent cases. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1963), it read a right to privacy into Article 21. Later, in Gobind v. State of M.P. (1975), the Court anchored privacy as part of personal liberty. Finally, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench unanimously declared informational privacy a facet of Article 21, requiring laws to meet a proportionality test—essentially a due-process standard. The habeas corpus jurisprudence culminating in the reversal of ADM Jabalpur (1976) in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (2007) further entrenched substantive fairness as a constitutional minimum.

Thus, through judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has effectively introduced due process of law into Article 21, converting a procedural shield into a substantive bulwark against arbitrary state action.

Q3. (a) Keshavananda illustrates judicial creativity and the policy-making role of the Supreme Court of a very high order and could be regarded to be an improvement over the formulation in Golaknath. Examine with the help of relevant arguments. (b) ‘Constitutional governance’ is a system where government authority is limited, defined and structured by a supreme written or unwritten constitution. Analyze with special reference to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. (c) “The concept of ‘natural justice’ is of variable content and imposes variable procedural norms from case to case.” Explain. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word is examine, so the examiner wants a critical analysis, not mere description. The question tests understanding of judicial activism in landmark constitutional cases (Golaknath vs. State of Punjab and Keshavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala), the doctrine of basic structure, and the policy-making role of the Supreme Court. A top answer must (1) contrast Golaknath’s rigid position with Keshavananda’s flexible basic-structure doctrine, (2) highlight judicial creativity and policy-making through the basic-structure test, and (3) illustrate with key judgments and constitutional provisions. The common mistake is to treat Keshavananda only as a case on amendment power without linking it to judicial policy-making or to ignore Golaknath’s foundational role.

Model answer

Judicial creativity and policy-making in Keshavananda Bharati

Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) marks a watershed in Indian constitutional adjudication by elevating judicial policy-making to a constitutional doctrine. Where Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) had frozen fundamental rights against parliamentary amendment, Keshavananda Bharati introduced the basic structure doctrine, allowing judicial review of constitutional amendments to protect the “essential features” of the Constitution. This shift transformed the Supreme Court from a mere interpreter to a constitutional architect, balancing parliamentary sovereignty with constitutional supremacy.

The Court’s creativity is evident in its procedural innovation. Instead of striking down the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments wholesale, it carved out a judicial test—the basic structure doctrine—that could invalidate amendments only when they damaged the Constitution’s “basic structure.” This flexible standard enabled the Court to protect federalism, secularism, and judicial independence while permitting legitimate amendments. The 13-judge bench decision (7:6 majority) itself reflects institutional consensus-building, a hallmark of judicial policy-making.

Illustratively, the doctrine has been used to strike down amendments that undermined federal balance (e.g., Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1980) and judicial review (Waman Rao v. Union of India, 1981). By embedding judicial values into the Constitution’s fabric, Keshavananda Bharati institutionalized a living constitution approach, where the Court periodically redefines constitutional limits in response to evolving governance needs.

In sum, Keshavananda Bharati exemplifies judicial creativity that transcends adjudication, embedding policy choices into constitutional law and ensuring the Constitution remains a dynamic instrument of governance.

Q4. (a) “The Supreme Court of India is a multi-jurisdictional Court and may be regarded as the most powerful Apex Court in the world.” Justify this statement supported by relevant constitutional provisions. (b) “It is the satisfaction of the President and not of the Central Cabinet, for proclamation of emergency in India.” Do you agree with it? Critically examine and also, discuss about the consequences of such proclamation. (c) “An ‘Ombudsman’ is the projection of the legislative function of supervising the administration.” Elucidate this statement in Indian perspectives with the help of examples. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “justify” in part (a) requires you to establish the Supreme Court’s multi-jurisdictional character and global pre-eminence using constitutional provisions. Examine Articles 32, 136, 141, 142 and 226 to show how the Court exercises writ, appellate, advisory, curative and supervisory jurisdictions. The common mistake is to stop at Article 32 and ignore the other jurisdictions that give the Court its extraordinary power.

Model answer

The Supreme Court of India is a multi-jurisdictional court and may indeed be regarded as the most powerful apex court in the world. Its power emanates from a combination of original, appellate, advisory, writ, review and curative jurisdictions enshrined in the Constitution.

Original Jurisdiction (Article 131) empowers the Court to adjudicate disputes between the Union and States or between States inter se, a feature unique to federal apex courts.

Appellate Jurisdiction (Articles 132-134, 136) allows the Court to hear appeals on constitutional, civil and criminal matters, including special leave petitions under Article 136 that bypass all prior forums, a power unmatched in most apex courts.

Writ Jurisdiction (Article 32) is the Court’s extraordinary tool to enforce fundamental rights, enabling it to issue directions, orders or writs for any purpose, a jurisdiction described by Dr. Ambedkar as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution.

Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 143) enables the President to seek the Court’s opinion on questions of law or fact, reinforcing its advisory supremacy.

Supervisory and Review Jurisdictions (Articles 141, 142) bind all courts to the Supreme Court’s law laid down and empower it to pass any order necessary for complete justice, including suo motu interventions and contempt proceedings.

These overlapping jurisdictions make the Supreme Court a multi-jurisdictional institution whose writ runs across the legal landscape of India, justifying its description as the most powerful apex court globally.

Q5. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) Whether International Law is a law in the true sense of the term ‘law’ or not? Examine. (b) Critically examine the theories which have been propounded to explain the relationship between International Law and Municipal Law. (c) What is 'asylum'? Is 'Right to Asylum' a fundamental right of a person in other country to save from prosecution? Explain. (d) What do you mean by imposing 'Double Veto' by a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations? Also, discuss its impact on decision-making process of the United Nations. (e) What do you understand by 'State succession' and 'State recognition'? Differentiate between them. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word ‘Examine’ asks for a reasoned evaluation rather than mere description. The examiner is testing (i) conceptual clarity on whether International Law qualifies as ‘law’, (ii) analytical grasp of monist-dualist theories and their Indian practice, and (iii) ability to distinguish between related doctrines. A top answer must structure the response in three parts: define International Law, present the rival theories with examples/cases, and critically assess their validity. The common mistake is to treat International Law as purely moral or political, ignoring its legal character and domestic enforcement mechanisms.

Model answer

International Law as ‘Law’ in the True Sense

International Law is law in the strict sense because it possesses three essential elements: a rule-making authority (States and international organisations), a body of binding norms (treaties, customary rules, general principles), and compulsory settlement mechanisms (ICJ, WTO dispute settlement, ICC). The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case (1927) held that International Law is binding because States consent to it and observe it as law. Domestic courts, including the Indian Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), have treated ratified treaties as part of municipal law under Article 253 and Article 51(c), demonstrating that International Law is enforceable in national jurisdictions.

Critics argue that International Law lacks a central legislature and sanctions. However, the UN Charter (Chapter VII) empowers the Security Council to impose binding measures, while the International Criminal Court can issue arrest warrants, thus providing enforcement teeth. Therefore, International Law meets the criteria of ‘law’—rules, authority, and sanction—even if decentralised.

Conclusion: International Law is law in the true sense, recognised by States, enforced domestically, and backed by international adjudicatory and coercive mechanisms, despite its distinctive features.

Q6. (a) "The present world economic order is supposed to be guided by the operation of free market forces propelled by free competition, based on free movement of goods and services including technology." Discuss the role of the principle of non-discrimination and free trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in this regard. (b) Discuss the grounds of 'intervention' and its types. State the circumstances under which lawful recourse to use of force for self-defence could be taken. Give its limitations also. (c) “International Law may be defined as that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which States feel themselves bound to observe and, therefore, do commonly observe in their relation to each other.” Explain. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Discuss” requires a balanced analysis of the GATT’s non-discrimination and free-trade principles, followed by an explanation of intervention grounds, types, and the lawful use of force in self-defence with its limits. Examiners test understanding of treaty provisions, judicial precedents, and the Charter exceptions. The common mistake is to treat the three sub-parts as isolated topics rather than weaving them into a coherent narrative of international economic and security law.

Model answer

The present world economic order is indeed predicated on the idea that free market forces, driven by competition and the free movement of goods, services, and technology, will deliver prosperity. Yet this liberal vision is not self-executing; it relies on binding legal disciplines. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) embeds two cardinal principles—non-discrimination and free trade—to discipline unilateral protectionism and create a predictable, rules-based system.

Non-discrimination operates through two pillars: Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment (Article I) and National Treatment (Article III). MFN obliges members to extend any trade advantage granted to one trading partner to all others, preventing bilateral deals from fracturing the multilateral edifice. National Treatment prohibits internal taxes and regulations from favouring domestic products over like imported ones once they have cleared customs. These rules were operationalised in landmark disputes such as Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), where the Appellate Body read “likeness” expansively to curb disguised protectionism. The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp (1998) further clarified that even non-trade objectives—like environmental protection—must comply with GATT disciplines if they discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably, illustrating how non-discrimination tempers unilateral policy space.

Free trade is advanced through tariff bindings and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (Article XI). Tariff schedules bind members’ applied rates, creating tariff ceilings; any increase beyond the bound rate triggers compensation or retaliation under Article XXVIII. The elimination of quotas—seen in the EC – Bananas III (2001) ruling against EU import licensing—reinforces predictability. Together, these disciplines reduce transaction costs, deter beggar-thy-neighbour policies, and anchor the multilateral trading system even amid geopolitical tensions.

In the security realm, intervention and the use of force remain contested. Grounds of intervention include consent, countermeasures, protection of nationals, and humanitarian intervention—though the last is controversial and lacks explicit Charter authority. Self-defence, codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, is lawful only when an armed attack occurs, the response is necessary and proportional, and the Security Council is immediately notified. The ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) read these conditions strictly, rejecting anticipatory self-defence unless the attack is imminent. Limitations are equally strict: self-defence cannot be invoked for economic coercion, nor can it be used to achieve regime change; collective self-defence requires a request from the victim state. These constraints prevent abuse while preserving the Charter’s central prohibition of force under Article 2(4).

International law, therefore, functions as the grammar that converts power into predictable cooperation. By disciplining discrimination and restricting recourse to force, it sustains both the market’s promise and the peace that underwrites it.

Q7. (a) Discuss the facts and the Principles of the Law of the Sea, emerged in ‘Corfu Channel Case’, with reference to the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Give your opinion, how far the ‘Strait of Hormuz’ problem could be resolved under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) in the light of the principle of ‘innocent passage’ by foreign vessels. Explain. (b) Discuss the composition, powers and functions of the Security Council of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. (c) Define the term ‘nationality’. State the various modes of acquisition of nationality by a person. Differentiate between ‘nationality’ and ‘domicile’. (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Discuss” requires a balanced analysis: (i) factual exposition of the Corfu Channel Case and the Law of the Sea principles, (ii) application of those principles to the Strait of Hormuz scenario under UNCLOS 1982, and (iii) a reasoned opinion. The examiner tests your grasp of maritime zones, UNCLOS provisions, and the doctrine of innocent passage. The common mistake is to treat the Strait of Hormuz as a mere geopolitical flashpoint without anchoring the solution in UNCLOS Articles and ICJ jurisprudence.

Model answer

Introduction

The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania, 1949) crystallised two cardinal principles of the Law of the Sea—freedom of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation and the sovereign rights of the coastal State over its territorial sea and contiguous zone. These principles were later codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, which offers a normative framework to resolve disputes such as the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Facts and Principles of the Corfu Channel Case

• Facts: In 1946, British warships transited the North Corfu Strait, a narrow passage between Albania and Greece. Albanian shore batteries fired on them, causing damage and casualties. The UK alleged that Albania had laid mines in the strait, endangering innocent passage.
• Principles:
  • Territorial Sea: The ICJ held that every State has sovereignty over its territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) subject to the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels (Article 17, UNCLOS 1982). Albania’s failure to warn of mines violated this duty.
  • Contiguous Zone: Although not directly ruled upon, the case implied that beyond the territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise limited control (customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary) in a contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles for preventing infringements of its laws (Article 33, UNCLOS 1982).

Strait of Hormuz under UNCLOS 1982 and the Principle of Innocent Passage

The Strait of Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation between Oman and Iran. Under UNCLOS Part III, such straits are subject to the regime of transit passage (Article 38), which is more liberal than innocent passage. However, if a coastal State designates a particular route as a “routeing system” under Article 41, foreign ships must follow it. Iran has not formally adopted such a system, so the default regime is transit passage. Iran’s interference with vessels—such as the 2019 seizures of the Stena Impero and the 2021 interception of an Iraqi tanker—must respect the right of transit passage. Any coastal State legislation imposing prior permission or fees would breach UNCLOS unless justified under the doctrine of “transit passage” exceptions (e.g., protecting the marine environment or national security under Article 42).

Opinion

UNCLOS 1982 provides a robust mechanism to resolve the Strait of Hormuz problem: it obliges Iran to refrain from suspending transit passage, permits Oman to designate sea lanes, and empowers flag States to seek ITLOS or ICJ adjudication under Part XV. The key is strict adherence to Articles 38–45 and avoidance of unilateral coercive measures that undermine the collective security architecture envisaged by the Convention.

Q8. (a) “The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944 adopted the statutes of two institutions to promote New International Economic Order for international financial cooperation and economic development.” Discuss the above statement in terms of the International Forum. (b) Discuss briefly 'pre and post' developments of Kyoto Environment Summit on Global Warming, 1997 for the protection and improvement of the human environment. (c) What do you mean by Human Rights? Discuss the procedure for the enforcement of Human Rights of a person as laid down under the International Law. ★★★ SB27—606 (15 marks)

How to approach this question

The directive word “Discuss” demands a structured, analytical response that traces historical origins, institutional mandates, and subsequent evolution. Examiners test (i) factual recall of the Bretton Woods Conference outcomes, (ii) legal and policy developments around the Kyoto Protocol, and (iii) conceptual clarity plus enforcement machinery for human rights under international law. Most aspirants err by either listing facts without linkage or by omitting post-Kyoto developments and the enforcement mechanics of human rights.

Model answer

The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944, convened at the Mount Washington Hotel, New Hampshire, USA, laid the constitutional architecture for the post-World War II international economic order. The conference adopted the Articles of Agreement of two pivotal institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now part of the World Bank Group) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their statutes were drafted to correct the failures of the interwar gold standard and competitive devaluation, aiming at exchange-rate stability, balanced trade, and reconstruction of war-ravaged economies. The IBRD’s initial mandate was to finance postwar reconstruction and long-term development through sovereign lending, exemplified by the 1947 loan to France under the Marshall Plan framework. The IMF, by contrast, was tasked with maintaining a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates anchored to the U.S. dollar convertible to gold at $35 per ounce—a regime that survived until the Nixon Shock of 15 August 1971, when the United States suspended dollar-gold convertibility, ending the Bretton Woods exchange system while leaving the institutional charters intact.

The Kyoto Environment Summit of December 1997 marked a watershed in global climate governance. Pre-Kyoto efforts, notably the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1987 Montreal Protocol, had framed environmental protection within sustainable development but lacked binding emission targets. The Kyoto Protocol introduced legally binding quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (QELRCs) for Annex I Parties, differentiated between developed and developing countries, and operationalized three market-based mechanisms—International Emissions Trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). Post-Kyoto developments unfolded in three phases. First, the 2001 Marrakech Accords finalized the “rulebook” for Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms and compliance procedures. Second, the 2012 Doha Amendment extended Kyoto’s second commitment period (2013–2020) while securing ratifications from 144 Parties. Third, the 2015 Paris Agreement replaced Kyoto’s top-down targets with nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and a global stocktake cycle, reflecting evolving scientific consensus and geopolitical realities.

Human rights are universal, inalienable entitlements inhering in all persons by virtue of their humanity, recognized in instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). Under international law, enforcement proceeds through a layered mechanism. At the Charter-based level, the Human Rights Council conducts the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and may establish commissions of inquiry, as in the 2011 Libya Commission. At the treaty-based level, States Parties submit periodic reports to treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which issue concluding observations and, in certain cases, individual communications, as seen in the 2018 case of N.B. v Spain under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Additionally, specialized agencies like the ILO enforce labor rights through supervisory procedures culminating in recommendations and, ultimately, public condemnation. Domestic avenues complement international mechanisms: Article 32 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights, while Article 226 enables High Courts to do likewise, thereby operationalizing international human rights norms within municipal law.

Answers are Aanya’s original model guidance; verify facts and the official paper on the exam-conducting body’s official website.

---

Related — other papers of this exam

• All papers — UPSC Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026 hub
• Essay (Paper-I) — questions & model answers
• General Studies-I (Paper-II) — questions & model answers
• General Studies-II (Paper-III) — questions & model answers
• General Studies-III (Paper-IV) — questions & model answers
• General Studies-IV (Paper-V) — questions & model answers