29 May Abraham Accords : Between Islamic Identity and Strategic Interests
This article covers “Daily Current Affairs”
SYLLABUS MAPPING : GS Paper 2 : International Relations
FOR PRELIMS : Abraham Accords, Arab-Israel conflict, Two-State Solution, PLO, Oslo Accords, Camp David Accords
FOR MAINS : Pakistan’s refusal to sign the Abraham Accords reflects the deep tension between its strategic dependence on the United States and its Islamic identity politics. Analyse the domestic, regional, and geopolitical constraints that make Pakistan-Israel normalisation extremely unlikely, and assess how this episode reshapes the US-Pakistan relationship and India’s strategic calculus in South Asia and West Asia.
First Gulf state to normalise. Received: F-35 jets, advanced drones, removal from FATF grey list. Signed Abraham Accord + Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization.
Signed same day as UAE. Small Gulf monarchy; strategic alignment with Saudi Arabia (which provided political cover). Received enhanced US defence cooperation.
US recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange. Normalisation was partly territorial — Morocco resolved a longstanding sovereignty dispute. Relations upgraded to full diplomatic ties.
Sudan removed from US State Sponsors of Terrorism list in exchange. Transitional government under Abdalla Hamdok signed — controversial given Sudan’s democratic transition was still fragile.
First Central Asian Muslim-majority state to join. Confirmed by US envoy Steve Witkoff. Signals US strategy to expand Accords beyond Arab world into broader Islamic bloc — now targeting Pakistan.
The grand prize for the Accords. Closest to signing — secret US-brokered deal reportedly involves US civilian nuclear cooperation + security treaty. Conditional on Gaza ceasefire and some Palestinian statehood pathway.
Declaration of the State of Israel (May 14, 1948); immediate invasion by Arab states. First Arab-Israeli War followed. Palestinian Nakba — ~750,000 Palestinians displaced. Beginning of six decades of conflict. Arab League declared collective non-recognition of Israel.
Israel captured West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, Golan Heights in 6 days. UN Resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and recognition of all states’ sovereignty — the “land for peace” framework that underlies all subsequent negotiations.
US President Carter brokered the Camp David Accords (1978) between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin — leading to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979), the first Arab-Israel peace deal. Egypt recognised Israel; Israel returned Sinai. Sadat assassinated in 1981.
The Oslo Accords — secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) — produced the Declaration of Principles: mutual recognition (Israel recognised PLO; PLO recognised Israel), creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and a framework for a Two-State Solution. Signed by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin with Clinton at the White House. Rabin assassinated in 1995.
The Wadi Araba Treaty — Jordan normalised relations with Israel under King Hussein. US provided economic incentives and debt relief. Second Arab state to make peace; remains the only Arab state with a warm peace with Israel.
Clinton’s attempt to finalise a permanent status agreement between Barak and Arafat at Camp David II failed — key sticking points: final borders, Jerusalem status, refugee right of return. Second Intifada (2000–05) followed — over 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis killed; peace process collapsed.
Jared Kushner-brokered deals brought UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan to normalise with Israel — bypassing the Palestinian issue. Framed as pragmatic “peace for peace” rather than “land for peace.” Palestine rejected as betrayal.
Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack killed ~1,200 Israelis — the deadliest single-day attack on Jews since the Holocaust. Israel’s military response in Gaza killed over 50,000 Palestinians by May 2026. The war reignited Arab public hostility to normalisation, making Saudi Arabia’s signing politically impossible without Gaza resolution.
Trump ties Abraham Accords expansion to Iran deal terms — declaring Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan must join as “mandatory” condition. Kazakhstan signs. Pakistan firmly rejects. Saudi Arabia remains the pivotal pending signatory.
| Core Issue | Israel’s Position | Palestine’s Position |
|---|---|---|
| Borders | 1967 lines with negotiated land swaps; retain major settlement blocs | Full withdrawal to pre-1967 borders; East Jerusalem as capital of Palestine |
| Jerusalem | Undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital; Trump recognised in 2017 | East Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as capital of Palestinian state; sovereignty over Al-Aqsa Mosque |
| Palestinian Refugees | Reject right of return; compensation and resettlement in Palestinian state only | Right of return for 5–7 million Palestinian refugees as per UN Resolution 194 |
| Settlements | 700,000+ Israeli settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem; reject full evacuation | All settlements are illegal under international law (UN SC Resolution 2334); must be evacuated |
| Two-State Solution | Conditional support — Netanyahu’s current government opposes Palestinian statehood | Insists on independent, viable, contiguous Palestinian state as precondition for any peace |
| Gaza & Hamas | Demands Hamas disarmament; refuses any governance role for Hamas post-war | Hamas controls Gaza; PA controls parts of West Bank — internal Palestinian division complicates representation |
- Symbolic legitimacy — Pakistan is the world’s only nuclear Muslim-majority state; its normalisation with Israel would provide enormous symbolic cover for other Islamic nations to follow, especially Saudi Arabia
- OIC fracture strategy — Pakistan is a founding member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); its signing would fundamentally undermine OIC’s collective position on Palestinian statehood
- Iran deal leverage — Trump is using Abraham Accords expansion as a bargaining chip in Iran nuclear negotiations; Pakistan’s geographical proximity to Iran and diplomatic influence makes its inclusion strategically valuable
- Post-ceasefire gratitude exploitation — US brokered the India-Pakistan ceasefire in May 2026; Washington is leveraging Pakistan’s dependence on US goodwill to extract concessions
- IMF conditionality angle — Pakistan is in its 24th IMF programme; US holds significant influence over IMF decisions and can apply pressure through aid/loan conditionalities
- Islamic identity politics — Pakistani state identity is built on pan-Islamic solidarity; PM Shehbaz Sharif and Defence Minister Khawaja Asif cannot politically afford normalisation with Israel without triggering mass protests
- Palestine support is constitutional — Pakistan’s foreign policy has consistently supported Palestinian statehood since 1947; PM Jinnah rejected India’s partition formula partly by analogy with Palestinian dispossession
- Military opposition — Pakistan Army historically views Israel as an adversary in the context of the broader Islamic world; army consent is essential for any Pakistan foreign policy shift of this magnitude
- Public opinion — Pakistan’s population of 240 million is overwhelmingly opposed to Israel normalisation; street protests would destabilise an already fragile political establishment
- China factor — China (Pakistan’s “iron brother“) is opposed to Abraham Accords expansion; signing would damage Pakistan’s relations with its most important economic partner
| Framework / Body | Key Details & Relevance |
|---|---|
| UN Resolution 242 (1967) | Passed after Six-Day War — calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and recognition of all states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Basis of “land for peace” principle — the framework underlying Oslo Accords and all subsequent negotiations. Still the legal foundation for Palestinian statehood claims. |
| PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) | Founded 1964; recognised as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab League (1974) and UN (Observer State since 2012). Led by Yasser Arafat until 2004. Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the PLO’s administrative arm in West Bank and Gaza. |
| Oslo Accords (1993) | Mutual recognition — Israel recognised PLO; PLO recognised Israel. Created Palestinian Authority; outlined 5-year interim self-governance framework. Never led to permanent status agreement — Camp David II (2000) and Taba (2001) negotiations failed. Oslo framework technically remains the legal basis for PA’s existence despite being widely considered dead. |
| OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) | 57-member intergovernmental organisation; 2nd largest after UN. Headquartered in Jeddah. Collective position: supports Palestinian statehood; opposes Israeli occupation. Pakistan is a founding member. Abraham Accords fracture OIC unity — UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan now have formal Israel ties despite OIC’s official stance. |
| Arab Peace Initiative (2002) | Saudi Arabia-authored proposal at the Arab League summit: all Arab states would normalise with Israel IF Israel withdraws to pre-1967 borders, accepts East Jerusalem as Palestinian capital, and agrees to a just solution for refugees. Israel declined. The Abraham Accords bypassed this framework entirely — normalisation without Palestinian statehood. |
| Two-State Solution | The internationally recognised framework: an independent State of Palestine coexisting with the State of Israel — based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as Palestinian capital. Supported by the UN, EU, Arab League, India, and most of the international community. Israel’s current government under Netanyahu opposes Palestinian statehood — the primary reason no peace deal is achievable in the current configuration. |
| Hamas vs PA | Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) controls Gaza since 2007 after routing the PA; classified as a terrorist organisation by Israel, USA, EU. Palestinian Authority (PA/Fatah) controls parts of the West Bank. Palestinian political division between Hamas and Fatah is a critical obstacle to any unified peace negotiation or Palestinian statehood. |
- India and Israel established full diplomatic relations in 1992 — late but steadily deepening. PM Modi became the first Indian PM to visit Israel in 2017
- Israel is India’s 3rd largest defence supplier — critical for drones (Heron, Harop), missile systems (Barak-8 co-developed with DRDO), and surveillance technology
- Bilateral trade: ~$10 billion (2024–25) including diamonds, chemicals, agri-tech. India-Israel FTA negotiations ongoing
- Post-Oct 7, India expressed solidarity with Israel’s right to self-defence while also calling for two-state solution and humanitarian ceasefire — a calibrated balance reflecting India’s ties with both Israel and Arab/Muslim world
- India was among the first non-Arab countries to recognise the PLO (1974) and Palestine as a state (1988) — long-standing historical commitment to Palestinian statehood
- 8.9 million Indians live in the Gulf — remittances of ~$55 billion annually; India’s energy security (60% of crude from West Asia) depends on Gulf stability
- Pakistan’s Abraham Accords signing would reduce Pakistan’s leverage with the Arab/Islamic world — potentially weakening its anti-India OIC resolutions (e.g., on Kashmir)
- India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) — announced G20 2023 — runs through UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel to Europe. Abraham Accords expansion enables IMEC’s regional diplomatic architecture
- Pragmatic peace-building — normalisation creates people-to-people ties, economic cooperation, and people-level familiarity that reduce the probability of conflict; the UAE-Israel economic partnership has flourished post-2020
- Counter-Iran alignment — the Accords created an informal anti-Iran security architecture in the Gulf; Pakistan signing would extend this containment strategy eastward, aligning with US strategic goals
- Abraham Accords have not required abandoning Palestinian cause — UAE has maintained financial and diplomatic support for Palestinians despite normalisation; the zero-sum framing is exaggerated
- For Pakistan: economic incentives could be transformative — US investment, debt relief, IMF support, and market access could help a country in acute economic distress
- Bypasses Palestinian rights — normalisation without Palestinian statehood legitimises Israeli occupation; the Accords allow Arab states to gain bilaterally while Palestinians receive nothing. Oct 7 happened partly because of deepening Arab-Israeli normalisation without Palestinian progress
- Coercive diplomacy — tying Abraham Accords to Iran deal is transactional pressure, not principled peace-building; Trump’s “mandatory” language treats sovereign nations as compliance subjects
- For Pakistan: domestic political suicide — signing would delegitimise any Pakistani government overnight; the army would never permit it given public sentiment
- Undermines UN framework — the Accords bypass UNSC Resolution 242, Oslo, and the Arab Peace Initiative — weakening the international rules-based framework for Middle East peace that India and most of the world supports
- Gaza ceasefire as prerequisite: Any meaningful expansion of the Abraham Accords — including Pakistan’s potential future engagement — is politically impossible without a credible Gaza ceasefire and humanitarian relief framework. The October 7 war has made the “peace without Palestine” model of the 2020 Accords untenable for domestic audiences across the Muslim world.
- Revive Two-State Solution pathway: The US must anchor the Abraham Accords within the Two-State Solution framework — making Palestinian statehood a clear outcome of the normalisation process, not a casualty of it. Saudi Arabia’s pending Accords signing should be conditioned on Israel committing to a credible Palestinian state pathway.
- India’s mediatory role: India’s unique position — strong ties with both Israel and the Arab/Muslim world, longstanding support for Palestinian statehood, and growing strategic partnership with the US — positions it to play a constructive back-channel role in bridging the Abraham Accords framework with UN-mandated peace principles.
- Pakistan’s rational engagement: Rather than outright refusal, Pakistan could adopt a “conditional engagement” position — willing to discuss normalisation only after a credible Palestinian state is established, linking its signature to Palestinian sovereignty. This preserves dignity while opening a diplomatic channel without the immediate political cost of signing.
- OIC reform: The Abraham Accords reveal the OIC’s irrelevance as individual Muslim states act unilaterally. A reformed OIC with effective mediation powers, credible sanctions against Israeli settlement expansion, and a Palestinian support fund could restore collective Muslim leverage in the peace process.
- IMEC opportunity: India should use the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) as a platform to build confidence between Israel and Arab states through economic integration — demonstrating that peace and prosperity are linked, and creating positive-sum incentives for regional normalisation beyond US pressure tactics.
“The Abraham Accords represent a transactional peace that bypasses the Palestinian question — pragmatic for its signatories but corrosive to the rules-based international framework for Middle East peace.” Critically examine the Abraham Accords, the US pressure on Pakistan to join them, and the implications of this geopolitical realignment for India’s interests in West Asia, its neighbourhood policy, and the Two-State Solution.
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